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PROFITING FROM UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES: A PROPOSAL TO
REGULATE MANAGEMENT
REPRESENTATIVES
Terry A. Bethel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, much attention has been devoted to consultants and at-

torneys who represent management in labor relations matters. Often
assailed by the labor movement as "union busters," and their activities

have come under increased scrutiny by the press, the Congress, and, to
a lesser extent, the courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board).' Publications ranging from union house organs 2 to
3 have made note of the increase in psychologithe Wall Street JournaP
cal warfare in the battle between labor and management for the sympathies of the workers. In 1979 and 1980, Congress held six days of
hearings devoted largely to the activities of consultants and attorneys
who help management resist union organizational efforts or uproot unions already in place. 4 The NLRB, the government's first line enforcer
of the right of employees to organize into unions and bargain collectively with their employers, has recognized that a problem may exist,
*
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two Indiana University law students, Lauren Robel, J.D. '83 and John Polley, J.D. '84.
1 The NLRB is an administrative agency established by the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1982). The Board's powers are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1982).
2 See, e.g., Report on Union Busters RUB Sheet, a monthly newsletter published by the National Organizing Coordinating Committee of the AFL-CIO.
3 Kimble, The NewAnti-Union Crusade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 19 & 26, 1983, at 18;
Martin, When the Boss Calls in This Expert, the Union May Be in Real Trouble,Wall St. J., Nov.
19, 1979, at 1, col. 6. See also Chernow, The New Pinkerons,MOTHER JONES, May, 1980, at 50;
The Union Busters,NEWSWEEK; Brill, Labor Outlaws,2 THE AM. LAW., April, 1980, at 16; Reeves,
The New Union Busters are on the March, San Jose Mercury, May 19, 1980.
4 Pressuresin Today's Workplace: Oversight HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relationsof the Committee on Educationand LaborHouse of Representatives,96th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. (vols. 1-4) (1979-1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION

CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON PRESSURES IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE (Comm.
ter cited as REPORT].

AND LABOR, 96TH

Print 1980) [hereinaf-
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but has eschewed its ability to rectify it under existing law.5
For all the hubbub, however, little hard data exists concerning the
extent of activities of those who have been called the "new
Pinkertons. ' 6 No one doubts that representation of management in labor matters by both consultants and attorneys is a big business. Many,
indeed, feel that it is a booming industry. What is known about the
numbers of those involved would appear to prove the point. 7 Whatever
their numbers, much less is known about what consultants actually do.
Union leaders have charged that once the organizational campaign begins, management consultants effectively take over the operation of the
enterprise, and that all other activity becomes secondary. 8 The same
leaders also charge that, once in place, the consultants establish an
armed camp in which the employer's supervisors become the primary
weapon, spreading fear and distrust among the employees. 9 For their
part, the consultants deny such allegations and assert that they merely
assist employers in their legal right to resist unionization.' 0
Given the perceived spread of consultant activities, and the result5 See e.g., 4 Hearings,supranote 4, at 18-28 (testimony of William A. Lubbers, NLRB General Counsel). Although Mr. Lubbers expressed concern about unlawful consultant conduct and a
willingness to combat it, i. at 18-19, he also acknowledged the difficulty of discovering or proving
such activities, id. at 20, 25.
6 See Chernow, supranote 3. See also 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 112 (statement of Nancy
Mills) ("Today's Pinkertons are three-piece-suited lawyers with briefcases stuffed with psychological armaments.").
7 There are no figures indicating the precise numbers of firms or individuals involved in
management representation. In the 1979-1980 OversightHearings,Robert A. Georgine, President
of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, claimed that more than
1,000 firms and 1,500 individuals were involved in such representation, and that most of them had
emerged since 1970. 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 410. Georgine did not cite the source of his
figures. In addition to union testimony, a prominent consultant estimated that his industry had
experienced "a tenfold growth in the past 10 years." 3 id at 112 (testimony of Herbert G. Melnick, Chairman of the Board, Modern Management, Inc.,). See also 4 id at 2 (testimony of Assistant Sec. of Labor William Hobgood, characterizing consulting as a "growth industry"); REPORT,
supra note 4, at 26-29.
8 See, e.g., I Hearings,supra note 4, at 59 (testimony of Alan Kistler, Director of Organization
and Field Services, AFL-CIO). See also REPORT, supra note 4, at 32, and citations contained
therein.
9 See e.g., 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 110-11 (testimony of Nancy Mills). As to the use of
supervisors, see id at 28-29 (prepared statement of Alan Kistler); 3 id at 156, 160-66 (prepared
statement of Robert L. Muchlenkamp).
10 For example, Fred Long, Chairman of the Board of a consulting firm named West Coast
Industrial Relations Association, has characterized his firm as similar to a doctor whose job is to
"determine what ails a company in its relationship with employees and to cure it." 3 id.at 305.
Long also asserted that his firm "strives to improve the status of employees whenever and wherever we can." Id. at 306. In the same hearings, Herbert G. Melnick, Chairman of the Board of
Modern Management, Inc., a Chicago-based consulting firm, said that his organization's "primary
function is one of advising and consulting with management in order to assist in establishing and
maintaining good management-employee practices." Id at 75. Melnick also testified that, in a
union organizing drive, management should get employee support only when it deserves it, adding
that "[o]ur function is to help an employer deserve the employee's support." Id at 76.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

ing inability of the labor movement to cope effectively with sophisticated and expensiveI psychological campaigns, labor leaders and some
members of Congress have called for increased examination and regulation of labor consultant activity.' 2 The dominant theme has been for
increased enforcement of the reporting requirements of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).13 This article
will not question the conclusion, urged by other commentators and
supported by labor, that increased enforcement of the LMRDA will
help unions compete against consultant-led campaigns.' 4 Even if that
conclusion is valid, however, disclosure of consulting activity will do
little to stem one of the most troublesome aspects of so-called "union
busting": employer participation in illegal campaign tactics, sometimes
with the encouragement or assistance of consultants.
Although there is no reason to believe that most management advisors counsel unlawful conduct, there is evidence which suggests that
significant numbers do. This article will argue that illegal campaigning
and other unlawful interference pose a serious threat to the right of
employees to make their own decisions about union representation. It
will explain how employers take advantage of their own lawlessness in
campaigns against the union and describe the role that consultants and
attorneys play in the process. It will conclude that neither traditional
NLRB remedies aimed at employers nor federal reporting requirements aimed at consultants are sufficient to protect employee rights.
Instead, the article will propose direct NLRB action against attorneys
and consultants who violate the law or who counsel and encourage
others to do so.
11 Although detailed data concerning the amounts received by consultants is not available,
during the 1979 Hearings, one witness introduced a memorandum from the Massachusetts Rate
Setting Commission purporting to show that from 1973 to 1976, six hospitals in Massachusetts had
paid $256,892 to Modern Management, Inc. The memo stated that since its audit techniques
relied on samplings, the figure did "not represent the full penetration of [Modern Management] in
the industry." I id. at 103-04.
12 Most of the testimony of union witnesses at the 1979-1980 Hearingsurged greater governmental regulation of consultant activities. See, e.g., I id. at 32 (Kistler testimony); id. at 410 (Georgine testimony). As to congressional concern, see REPORT, supra note 4, at 43-45.
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982). As to calls for reform, see, e.g., 1 Hearings, supra note 4, at 35
(Kistler testimony). See also REPORT, supra note 4, at 45, (a majority of the subcommittee encouraging the Department of Labor to "undertake a thorough re-examination of the employer and
consultant reporting and disclosure provisions").
14 See, e.g., Bernstein, Union-Busting From Benign Neglect to MalignantGrowth, 14 U.C.D. L.

REv. 1, 11-40 (1980). See also Craver, The Application ofthe LMDR.

'Labor Consultant"Report-

ing Requirements to Management Attorneys: Benign Neglect Personified 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 605
(1978). But see Coleman & Baskin, FinancialDisclosure Under the LM.D.RA: Al Growing Problemfor Labor Lawyers, 67 A.B.A. J. 182 (1981).
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II.

NARROWING THE ISSUE

A.

"hat Is a Union BusteP

At least one obstacle to significant regulatory reform of the
problems caused by consultants is labor's inability to convince the
Board (or Congress) that serious abuse exists. Despite labor's persistent
outcry, the Board seldom has addressed the matter directly and, on
those occasions when consultant activities have been at issue, has been
loathe to find fault or impose sanctions. 15 Part of the Board's hesitancy
may be the labor movement's willingness to cry "wolf' too often. An
example is labor's unfortunate labeling of virtually any management
representative as a "union buster." An AFL-CIO publication entitled
"Peddling the 'Union-Free' Guarantee," for example, claims:
Thousands of lawyers and other individuals are involved on a daily
basis in advising and participating in the process of union busting. In the
fifteen years the AFL-CIO organizing department has been keeping card
files on lawyers involved in NLRB campaigns, more than 800 different
lawyers and firms have
participated or represented management in or16
ganizing campaigns.
The problem might be one of definition. If furnishing advice to
employers faced with a union organizing drive or representing employers in NLRB proceedings constitutes "union busting," then the AFLCIO's assertion is correct-thousands of lawyers and consultants are
involved. The term "union-buster," however, suggests a person who
does more than render advice about campaign tactics or advocates a
cause in an administrative hearing. Historically, it has provoked the
image of club-swinging hooligans, hired by management to beat sense
into (or hell out of) union adherents.' 7 Few would suggest that today's
consultants either engage in or counsel such activity.
There is evidence, however, that some of today's consultants and
attorneys approach unionization with a zeal comparable to that displayed by yesterday's Pinkertons.18 The battle today, however, is for
the employees' minds instead of their scalps. Even so, there is no evidence that all attorneys and consultants engage in or counsel conduct
that is unlawful or that seriously jeopardizes employee rights. What
the labor movement has been unable, or unwilling, to do is distinguish
between those advisors who are involved in improper activities and
those who are aggressive and effective, but within the law.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 100-22.
16 McDonald & Wilson, Peddling the 'Union-Free'Guarantee,AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATIONIST
(1979)(copy on file with author).
17 R. BOYER & H. MoRAms, LABOR'S UNTOLD STORY (3d ed. 1977); C. LARROW, HARRY
BRIDGES (1972); C. WOOD & H. COLEMAN, DON'T TREAD ON ME (1928). See also I Hearings,
supra note 4, at 189 (statement of J.C. Turner, President of International Union of Operating
Engineers).
18 See supra text accompanying notes 6-10. See also REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-38.
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Despite the propaganda efforts of organized labor, it is clear that

management representatives have an important role to play and that
most are not deserving of condemnation for activities on behalf of their

clients. Although the choice to unionize or not is clearly one for employees alone, the labor movement, in its passion to point out abuses,

often overlooks the statutory right of employers to express opinions

about the decisions that employees will make. 19 Equally ignored is the
fact that not all employers are corporate giants with in-house legal or

personnel expertise. Most collective bargaining relationships are estab-

lished in units with about fifty employees. 20 Despite the efforts of the

labor movement to paint itself as the decided underdog, small employers often face experienced and efficient union organizers financed by a

large international union. It is not surprising that such employers turn
to attorneys and consultants in order to understand their rights and

protect their interests. 2' These advisors, however, are not "union-busters" merely because they represent management.

The type of sophisticated psychological campaigns described at
the recent congressional hearings might not epitomize employee free
19 Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, provides: "The expressing of
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof... shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice. . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982). Sometimes referred to as the employer free
speech provision, section 8(c) was added by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 in response to
NLRB decisions that had denied to employers the right to express opinions about unionization.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941); I NLRB ANN. REP. 64 (1937). But
see NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941). For the legislative history of
section 8(c), see H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 549 (1948) ("The purpose
is to protect the right of free speech when what the employer says or writes is not of a threatening
nature or does not promise a prohibited favorable discrimination.").
20 For example, in the fiscal year 1977, the average number of employees voting in elections
was 53. More than 70% of the elections were conducted in units of fewer than 50 employees. 42
NLRB ANN. REP. 20, 306 (1977). In fiscal 1978, the average was 51 with more than 70% of the
elections in units under 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 16,278 (1978); in fiscal 1979, the average was 63 with
nearly 70% in units under 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 18,310 (1979); in fiscal 1980, the average was 56,
with approximately 70% in units; and in fiscal 1981, the average was 52, with approximately 70%
in units under 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 18,220 (1981).
21 See I Hearings,supranote 4, at 26 (Kistler testimony) ("A few very large firms can maintain
in-house the kind of expert ability needed. Others need outside assistance."). It is also clear that
the representation of consultants and attorneys often proves valuable. In Kimball Tire Co., 240
N.L.R.B. 343 (1979), for example, attorney-consultant Fred Long of West Coast Industrial Relations Association, a firm often targeted by unions, see infra note 72, advised an employer not to lay
off employees during the campaign, advice which the employer ignored. Also, in Presto Casting
Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 346 (1982), Long took the place of an associate who had not gotten along with a
union representative, and provided practical and lawful advice about good faith negotiation.
Without the benefit of such expertise, an employer acting out of ignorance might infringe on
employee's section 7 rights.
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choice,22 but they are at least a step forward from the persuasion by
force of the 1930s and 1940s. 23 Rather than complain about the effectiveness of these employer campaigns, the unions might develop their

own strategies to meet them. Surely, a movement that has become so
adept at propagandizing its own virtues can devise a more effective

counter-strategy than its current campaign of foot stomping and name
calling. Instead of condemning all management representatives, the
unions' call for increased regulation should focus on those who bend or

break the law. The rest might be neutralized merely by turning their
own tactics against them. 24
B.

The Advantages of Law Breaking

Concluding that the labor movement has overstated the number of
management advisors engaged in improper activity does not minimize
the problem. Rather, it highlights the dominant issue of disregard for
the law and misuse of NLRB processes. As the case reports demon-

strate, employers do not flout the law merely to express their disapproval of unions. They can, and do, use lawlessness to their
considerable advantage.
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) es•tablishes the right of employees to organize, join labor unions and bar-

gain collectively with their employer. 25 Those rights are protected

through the prohibition of several employer and union unfair labor

practices. Thus, section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer interference with,
22 See e.g., 1 Hearings,supranote 4, at 101-120 (testimony of Nancy Mills, a union organizer
at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and Joana Lira, an employee of St. Elizabeth's).
23 See supra note 17.
24 In a Mother Jones article, for example, the author describes how a union anticipated and
exploited the campaign strategy of Modem Management at Boston University. Chernow, supra
note 3, at 52.
In addition, in a recent colloquium in New York, John Oshinuski, a staff member of the
United Steelworkers Union, said: "After all, the management consulting companies are only
turning around our very weapons for their own use. There's nothing original in what they're
doing. They have adopted our procedures, refined them, put them in the hands of psychologists
and sold them at a high price." The Labor Movement at the Crossroads,The Challenges of Organizing, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 57, 79 (1983). During the same conference, Professor Julius Getman spoke about the inadequacies of union propaganda in organizing campaigns:
The union campaigns that I have studied have tended to be as formalistic as the employer's campaign. There is a heavy reliance on literature that people do not read. I studied
one election where the union simply crossed out the name of another group of employees to
whom they were sending their message, and wrote, "Dear Employee of.
...
It seems to
me that this is not atypical. It was a crude demonstration of one union's lack of personal
involvement with the employee; good union organizers do receive better responses.
Id. at 74.
25 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]mployees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
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restraint of, or coercion of section 7 rights, 26 section 8(a)(3) bans employer discrimination against employee union activity, 27 and section

8(a)(5) mandates that, once an employee representative is chosen, the
employer must bargain in good faith. 28 Actual enforcement of the Act,
however, is not as impressive as the bold statement of rights in section 7

or the array of weapons in section 8. Employers are often able to use
the Act's cumbersome and time-consuming administrative and judicial
proceedings to their advantage. They can also openly defy the law and
reap not punishment but reward.
Perhaps the best example of the advantages of law-breaking is the
discharge of a union adherent during a union organizing drive.
Although the Act expressly bans discrimination in retaliation for union
activity, such action is thought by many to be the most effective
weapon against unionization. 29 The theory is that by demonstrating
the depth of its opposition to the union and the lengths to which it will

go to oppose it, the employer is able to chill the organizational rights of
the other employees. Even if a section 8(a)(3) charge is ultimately sustained (after several months), 30 the employer's maximum exposure is
an order to cease and desist from the unlawful conduct, post NLRB

notices, and give back pay to the aggrieved employee. 3 ' The Board has

26 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). Section 8(a)(1) provides that "[ilt
shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees'in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in [section 7]."
27 Id § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part, that "jilt shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer. . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of empl6yment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization."
28 Id.§ 158(a)(5). Section 8(a)(5) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t
shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees." Section 8(d) of the Act, id § 158(d), defines the employer's obligation to bargain collectively as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
29 See, e.g., Axelrod, Common Obstacles to Organizing Under the NLRA: Combatting the
Southern Strategy, 59 N.C.L. REv. 147, 156-57 (1980).
30 See, e.g., id.at 150 n. 19. The writer chronicled the discriminatory discharge of several employees and the Board's delay in issuing complaints and holding a hearing. Because of the seemingly interminable delays in the unfair labor practice proceedings, the Union was finally forced to
file a complaint in federal district court that demanded an injunction of further postponements.
31 The Board's remedial power is set forth in section 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1982), which provides in pertinent part:
If. . .the Board shall be of the opinion that any person. . . has engaged in. .. [an]
unfair labor practice, then the Board. . .shall issue and cause to be served . . . an order
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this [Act] . ...
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no enforcement power, however, and the court of appeals often will not
enforce its order for a year or more. 32 In one extreme example, a case
was settled after twenty-four years of litigation.3 3 Moreover, the back
pay order is subject to mitigation for any earnings received by the employee after the unlawful discharge, sometimes virtually negating the
34
effect of the award.
For a few thousand dollars in backpay and legal fees, then, employers are able to thwart employee rights to organize. Even if the costs
are more substantial, employers seem willing to run the risk, especially
considering the perceived costliness of collective bargaining and the resulting loss of managerial freedom. 35 An apt example is the case of
one of the country's most notorious antilabor outlaws, J.P. Stevens and
Company, whose back pay liability at one point stood at a reported 1.3
million dollars. The sum seems substantial until compared to the more
32 E.g., St. Francis Fed'n of Nurses v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984), enforcing 263
N.L.R.B. 834 (1982).
33 This protracted litigation spawned the famous case of Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). The dispute arose from the termination of operations at a plant in
November, 1956, two months after the Textile Workers had won a representation election. Id at
266. Six years after the plant closing, the Board rendered its first decision respecting the employer's liability in Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962). This six year period was consumed by administrative hearings, and exceptions to the procedures used therein, to determine the
proper-party defendant. Id. at 241-42. The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's
order, Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), and the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for further findings, 380 U.S. 263 (1965). Eleven years after the plant
closing, the Board affirmed its 1962 decision and order. Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074
(1967). This time around, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order, Darlington Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 393 U.S. 1023
(1969).
Litigation continued to determine to whom and in what amounts back pay was due. In Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977), the court held that the parent corporation, Deering Milliken, was entitled to inspect certain agency documents that were in the
possession of the General Counsel. Because inspection was demanded pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act, Deering Milliken was also awarded reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982). Id. at 1138. The case was settled in December 1980 by payment of
$5,000,000 to the former employees and their heirs. For a former union attorney's comments on
Darlington,see Eames, The History of the Litigation of Darlington as an Exercise in Administratie
Procedure,5 U. TOL. L. REv. 595 (1974).
34 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-200 (1941), in which the Court held
that in fashioning backpay remedies the Board must deduct the amounts earned by the dischargees and the amounts that could have been earned in substantially equivalent employment. Because dilatory reinstatement was encouraged by the cumulative, mitigative effects of more
lucrative employment that was found several months after the illegal discharge, the Board in F.W.
Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950), limited the offsetting effect of wages from such employment to the annual quarter in which such wages were earned.
35 Axelrod, supra note 29, at 156-57; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 59 (1964) Note,
NLRB Power to Award Damagesin UnfairLabor PraticeCases, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1670. 1673-74
(1971). See also Skelton, Economic Analysis of the Costs and Benefts of Employer Unfair Labor
Practices,59 N.C.L. REv. 167 (1980).
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than twelve million dollars that a mere one
cent per hour wage increase
36
would have cost over the same period.
36 See J. ATELSON, R. ROBIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN & E. SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS, UNIT ONE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

317-18 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J.ATELSON]. For a more complete history of the J.P. Stevens
litigation, see Kovach, J.P. Stevens and the Struggle for Union Organization,29 LAB. L.J. 300
(1978). See also the following chronology of J.P. Stevens unfair labor practice cases: J.P. Stevens
& Co. and Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO, 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced with modification,
380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1968) (Stevens I); J.P. Stevens & Co. and
Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO, 163 N.L.R.B. 217 (1967), enforced with modflcation, 388 F.2d 896
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,393 U.S. 836 (1968) (Stevens II); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Indus. Union
Dept., AFL-CIO, 167 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), enforced with modfication, 406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.
1968) (Stevens III); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO, 167 N.L.R.B. 258
(1967), enforced,406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968) (Stevens IV); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Indus. Union
Dept., AFL-CIO, 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969) (Stevens V);
J.P. Stevens & Co. and Indus. Union Dept., AFL-CIO, modified 431 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1970)
(Stevens VI); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 179 N.L.R.B. 254
(1969), enforced 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 830 (1971) (Stevens VII); J.P.
Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 181 N.L.R.B. 666 (1970), enforced
inpart,449 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1971) (Stevens VIII); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union
of Am., AFL-CIO, 183 N.L.R.B. 25 (1970), enforced 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972) (Stevens IX);
183 N.L.R.B. 267 (1970) (Stevens X); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am.,
AFL-CIO, 186 N.L.R.B. 180 (1970), enforced 455 F.2d 607 (1971) (Stevens XI); J.P. Stevens &
Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 190 N.L.R.B. 751 (1971), remanded,475 F.2d
973 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Stevens XII); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFLCIO, 219 N.L.R.B. 850 (1975), enforced 547 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1976) (Stevens XIII); J.P. Stevens
& Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 217 N.L.R.B. 513 (1975) (Stevens XIV); J.P.
Stevens & Co. and Textile Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 220 N.L.R.B. 270 (1975) (Stevens
XV); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 239
N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), enforced in part, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1077
(1981), cert. granted, vacated andremanded 458 U.S. 1118 (1982) (Stevens XVI); J.P. Stevens &
Co. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 240 N.L.R.B. (1979),
enforced,89 L.C. (CCH) 12,157 (4th Cir. 1980); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 244 N.L.R.B. 407 (1979), enforced 668 F.2d 767 (4th Cir.
1982) (Stevens XVIII); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO, 245 N.L.R.B. 198 (1979), modified, 638 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1980) (Stevens XIX);
J.P. Stevens & Co. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 240
N.L.R.B. 33 (1979), enforced612 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 916 (1980) (Stevens XX); J.P. Stevens & Co. and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO,
247 N.L.R.B. 420 (1980) (Stevens XXI); 246 N.L.R.B. 1164 (1979) (granting petition to reopen
record) (Stevens XXII). See also HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, THE LABOR REFORM ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1977) (noting mitigative tax
effects on J.P. Stevens back pay liability); Brill, supra note 3; Ruben, Developments in Industrial
Relations, MONTHLY LAB. REV. Dec. 1980, at 66 (after fourteen years of battling the union, J.P.
Stevens signed the first contract which covered 3500 workers at 10 plants and gave union representational rights at other plants for eighteen months); Lehner, As Union Organizers Get to Milledgeville,
Ga., The Mayor Holds an Unusual Welcoming Party Wall St. J.,Feb. 29, 1980, at 42.
Although the Textile Workers have secured an initial contract with J.P. Stevens, see Ruben, supra.
at 66, it merely conceded the benefits which had been given workers at nonunion plants. It seems
likely that Stevens' execution of the contract was motivated by a desire to escape escalating contempt sanctions. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976). According to a recent newspaper report, J.P. Stevens has settled all remaining unfair labor practice charges by the payment of $1.2 million. See
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In addition to discriminatory discharge, the Board regulates other

aspects of an organizational campaign. Its most pervasive, and most
controversial, regulation is of the content of the propaganda sent to
employees by both management and unions during the campaign.
Although a 1976 study questions the effectiveness of any campaign

propaganda (as well as the effect of certain other unlawful campaign
practices), 37 it is likely that few employer representatives concur with

its findings. 38 And, if one is to believe their testimony, union leaders are
also convinced that employees are swayed by coercive employer
39
propaganda.

Whatever the effect of coercive propaganda, the NLRB continues,
with court enforcement, to regulate it either as an unfair labor practice
under section 8(a)(1) or through the election process itself.40 The
Board also regulates other campaign practices, such as employer surveillance of employee concerted activity,4 1 interrogation concerning
union activity,42 and the granting of benefits with the purpose of affectStetson, Stevens Settles411 Unfair-LaborCharges With $1.2 Million, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1983, at
A16, cols. 4-6.
37 See J. GETMAN,

S.

GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW

AND REALITY (1976). [hereinafter cited as J. GETMAN

STUDY).

In brief, the Getman study sought

to determine whether certain unlawful campaign practices had more of an effect on voters than
lawful campaign practices. Based on their data, the authors concluded that unlawful campaigning was no more persuasive, at least in part because employees do not pay attention to the content
of campaign propaganda. Id at 109.
The Getman study produced considerable debate among both practitioners and scholars.
The authors replied in Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union RepresentationElections: Law and Reality. TheAuthors Respondto the Critics,79 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1981), which also includes citations

to the criticism, id.at 567 nn.16-24.
38 There has been no empirical evaluation of management advisor's response to the Getman
study. However, those representatives continue to counsel extensive propaganda campaigns. See,
e.g., R. LEWIS & W. KRUPMAN, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS: MANAGEMENT'S STRATEGY AND
PREVENTIVE PROGRAMS 69-80 (2d ed. 1979). One prominent management attorney (and former
NLRB chairman) concluded that the study was not an indictment of all employer propaganda,
but alerted employers to listen to employees and campaign on the issues important to them. See
Miller, The Getman, Goldberg, and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163-68 (1976).
39 Much of the testimony at the 1979-1980 Hearings concerning activities of management consultants included reference to their psychological campaigns, through either written or oral propaganda. See, e.g., 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 40-100 (Kistler statement); id at 101-20 (Mills
statement); id. at 190 (Schlossberg statement); id. at 408 (Georgine statement); id at 636
(Winpinsinger statement). For the views of a lawyer-academician who questions the Getman

study, see Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study Froma Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 28
STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1976).
40 Even if employer (or union) campaign conduct does'not constitute an unfair labor practice,

the Board sometimes sets aside an election and orders a new one because of a violation of the
laboratory conditions surrounding the election. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 47 (1976). See also General Shoe Corp., 77
N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
41 E.g., Maywood Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 979, 986 (1980). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 40, at
172-73.
42 Eg., Maywood Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. at 985. See also R. GORMAN, supra note 40, at 173-78.
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ing the outcome of elections. 43 The standard Board remedy for all of
these violations is an order to cease and desist from the unlawful conduct. In addition, if an election results in an employer victory, the
Board will set it aside the election and order a new one.44 Some employers apparently believe, however, that these unlawful campaign tac-

tics are worth the risk. Without them, they believe that they will
certainly lose; with them, they might prevail. 45 Even if the election is
set aside, an employer's chances of winning a re-run election are far
superior to those of winning an initial election. 46 Thus, the initial un-

fair campaign
can pay important benefits even in a subsequent "clean"
47

election.
Employers are equally effective at frustrating employee rights once
the union has gained representative status. The more egregious of-

fenses include closing all or part of a unionized plant and moving to a
more hospitable labor relations environment 48 and engaging in "surface" bargaining with the hope that employees will become dissatisfied
43 E.g., NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1964).
44 E.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 464, 466 (1 1th Cir. 1982). See also R. GORMAN,

supra note 40, at 52-53.
45 For one of the boldest statements of this belief, see Transcript of a Tape Recording of a

Seminar Conducted by Fred Long, Chairman of the Board, West Coast Industrial Relations Association (1980) (a California-based consulting firm) (recording made surreptitiously) (on file with
author):
If you got a clearcut victory you play it clean. If it is close, you may be playing the
peripheries of the law. And if it is not close, you are going to get crucified. You got to
remember you only lose once. What happens if you violate the law? The probability is you
will never get caught. If you do get caught, the worst thing that can happen to you is you get a
second election and the employer wins 96% of those second elections. So the odds are with
you.

See also Axelrod, supra note 29.

46 See, e.g., 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 292, 294 (1977). Tables IIE and 13 indicate that in 1977
employers won 68.2% of rerun elections while winning only 54% of all elections; in 1978 the employer won 67.4% of rerun elections and 54% of all elections, 43 NLRB ANN. REP. 264,266 (1978);
in 1979 the employer won 68.2% of rerun elections and 55% of all elections, 44 NLRB ANN. REP.
294, 297 (1979); in 1980, the employer won nearly 76% of rerun elections and 54.3% of all elections, 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 267, 270 (1980); in 1981 the employer won 70.3% of rerun elections
and 56.9% of all elections, 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 202, 204 (1981). See also Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run
Elections: .4 Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963) (discussed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 611 n.31 (1969)).

47 Employers do not, however, have a complete license to violate the Act. In addition to cease
and desist orders and other remedies, the Board holds as its trump card the possibility of issuing a
bargaining order to dissipate the effects of the employer's unlawful conduct. See NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See also R. GORMAN, supranote 40, at 93-104. Although such

orders are not routinely issued, their possibility might dissuade some particularly egregious employer conduct, especially since the Board's criteria for bargaining orders are not well articulated.
For judicial criticism of the Board's approach, see NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894,
901-05 (2d Cir. 1971).
48 These so-called "runaway shop" cases are aptly demonstrated by Local 57, ILGWU v.
NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,387 U.S. 942 (1967), where the court
enforced a Board order that the employer violated section 8(a)(3) by moving its operations from
New York to Miami in order to avoid bargaining with the union.
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with the union's progress and decertify it.4 9 Again, NLRB remedies
have proven ineffective against those who are determined to break the

law. The Board seldom orders employers to reopen closed plants and,
even when it does, only rarely have its orders been enforced by the

courts of appeals.5 0 The federal policy favoring nonintervention by the

government in private negotiations often frustrates Board efforts to
remedy employer surface bargaining. For example, the Board has only
limited ability to weigh the substantive content of proposals in order to

power to order employers to
determine requisite good faith and has no
5
make, or agree to, particular proposals. '
Another significant difficulty with the use of traditional NLRB
49 See, e.g., I Hearings, supra note 4, at 291-94 (Robert H. Fox statement); id at 294-314
(Lloyd Laudermil statement). The Act authorizes employees to file decertification petitions whenever the incumbent union "is no longer a representative." 29 U.S.C. § 159c(l)(A)(ii) (1982).
Although both the statute and NLRB decisions prohibit employer initiated decertification efforts,
see, e.g., Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415 (1968), coaching decertification has
become a favorite topic of consultants. See, e.g., 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 315 (reprint of T.
YEISER, How TO DECERTIFY A UNION (1979)); id. at 45-46 (reprint of advertisement for course
entitled "Deunionizing," offered by Attorney Francis T. Coleman and the University of Baltimore
School of Business); id. at 51-52 (reprint of advertisement for course entitled "The Process of
Decertification"); Martino, Decertpfcation Through Employer Free Speech, I ADELPHIA L. REV. 1
(1982). Although employee self-help in the form of a strike may be a possible response to employer surface bargaining, it might also actually aid the employer's cause. Thus, the employer
might hire permanent replacements for the strikers, further undermining the union's support. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
50 Orders to reopen issue only in cases of partial closing, e.g., Frito-Lay, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B.
753 (1977), enforcement denie4 585 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), or runaway shops, e.g., Case, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 798 (1978) enforcement deniedin partsub nom NLRB v. Gibralter Indus., 653 F.2d 1091
(1981). An employer does not violate the Act when it closes the entire business "even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union." Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 & n.20 (1965). The Board's attitude concerning orders to reopen
was summarized by the A.LJ. in N.C. Coastal Motor Lines, Inc. and Freight Drivers and Helpers
Local Union No. 557, 219 N.L.R.B. 1009, 1014 (1975):
The Board has expressed reluctance to order the resumption of operations, especially in
cases where the closing of operations was for nondiscriminatory reasons, and where machinery has been removed or plant facilities are otherwise not available. . . . A similar reluctance has been expressed where the change was a major one entailing a substantial
withdrawal of capital investment, where the remaining operation bears little relationship to
the discontinued operation, or where other practical considerations weigh against the restoraHowever, in other cases where. . . there is strong evidence
tion of the status quo ante ....
that a discriminatory motive brought about the change of operations, and the change itself
consists for the most part, of shift of work from unit employees to others without a substantial
physical change in operations, the Board has ordered a resumption of operations.
The courts, however, are often more restrained than the Board. See NLRB v. R & H Masonry
Supply, Inc., 627 F.2d 1013, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Appliances,
Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 80-81 (5th
Cir. 1965). But see Florida-Texas Freight, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 509, enforced memn, 489 F.2d 1275
(6th Cir. 1974).
51 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102-09 (1970); NLRB v. American Ins.
Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). See also section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)
(providing that the obligation to bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession").
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processes to dissuade blatant law breakers is the nature of the Board's
authority. Its powers are remedial, not punitive.5 2 The Board's orders,
moreover, are not self-executing, but are enforced on petition to the
federal courts of appeals, a costly and time-consuming process. 5 3 The
theory of the Board's remedial power appears to be that those adjudged

guilty of misdeeds will not only remedy the harm caused by the unfair
labor practice, but will respect the regulatory agency's order to cease
and desist from further unlawful activity.5 4 The system, then, is premised on a respect for both the law and the administrative process. It is
ill-equipped to deal with those employers who see the law only as an
impediment to their ultimate objective of defeating the union and who
utilize the delay inherent in the administrative proceedings to accom55
plish that end.
The only serious effort to strengthen the Board's authority came in
the ill-fated Labor Law Reform Act of 1978.56 That legislation would
have allowed the Board to combat discriminatory discharges by doub-

ling back pay awards and would have remedied surface bargaining by
providing a "make whole" formula designed to remove the incentive to
delay or otherwise frustrate the bargaining process.5 7 Both measures
died in a Senate filibuster.58 There have been no legislative attempts to
52 In Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940), the Supreme Court said:
The Act is essentially remedial. It does not carry a penal program declaring the described unfair labor Practices to be crimes. . . . [The Board's remedies] relate to the protection of the employees and the redress of their grievances, not to the redress of any supposed
public injury after the employees have been made secure in their right of collective bargaining and have been made whole.
See also NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1976) ("In line
with the Act's essentially remedial rather than penal purpose, Board orders may not be punitive or
confiscatory and must be reasonably adapted to the situation that calls for redress.").
53 Section 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982), provides that the Board has the power to
petition the court of appeals for enforcement of its orders. Section 10(1), id. § 160(f), allows "[a]ny
person aggrieved by a final order of the Board" to seek review in the court of appeals. In its 1981
Annual Report, the Board reported that it was involved in more litigation than any other federal
administrative agency and that the average time for disposition of court proceedings during the
fiscal year was 149 days. 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 23 (1981).
54 See, e-g., J. ATELSON, supranote 36, at 310-12. In that work, the authors identify and criticize traditional arguments supporting non-coercive remedies. One such argument "rests on a suggestion that the law creates a moral code or set of ground rules that the parties follow because they
must work together." Id at 312.
55 The frustration that the government has experienced in dealing with frequent offenders is
reflected in the Second Circuit opinion in NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir.
1977), cert. deniea 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), the eighteenth federal court proceeding against the company. See supranote 36. Considering a contempt order against Stevens, the court noted that the
company had been adjudged in contempt twice before, saying that "[t]his case... raises grave
doubts about the ability of the courts to make the provisions of the federal labor law work in the
face of persistent violations." Id at 25-26.
56 S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
57 S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-35 (1978).
58 After five weeks of filibuster and the inability of the Act's proponents to garner the necessary votes for closure, the Senate unanimously consented to recommit the bill to committee, where
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increase the Board's remedial power since 1978, despite59 increased criticism of its ability to deal with persistent lawbreakers.
C. The Role of the Advisor
Much of the focus today is diverted away from the employer who
actually commits the unfair labor practice and toward the consultant or
attorney who counsels the employer. Perhaps more than in any other
area of the law, labor relations counselors are expected to do more than
merely give legal advice or provide technical expertise. As one commentator has said, "when labor or management retain a labor lawyer
they are not simply seeking technical legal counsel in the classic, neutral sense. Rather, they are seeking a comrade, a fellow warrior, a true
landsman in the basic socio-economic class struggle between labor and
management. ' 60 The fact that few lawyers or consultants serve both
sides of the conflict further demonstrates the depth of commitment expected to the cause. Although little hard data exists, most labor law
professionals would acknowledge that management and labor share
few counselors.
The proliferation of labor consultants combined with what labor
perceives as a stiffening of employer attitudes about employee organizing and concerted activity has caused many to speculate that this employer backbone is the result of consultant activity. 6' Although
consultants appear more modest about their accomplishments, there
seems little doubt that a primary purpose of consultants is to protect
employers against union organizing efforts or otherwise provide a socalled "union free environment." 62 The sticking point is the methods
they employ. The available evidence shows consultants stoutly defending their role in the employer-union conflict and professing their respect for, and adherence to, the law. 63 Labor just as vigorously protests
the unlawful practices allegedly fostered by consultants. 64 The actual
extent of labor consultant involvement in either campaigns or unlawful
it died at the close of the legislative session. Labor Law Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8410. 124
CONG. REC. 18,393, 18,400 (1978).
59 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 14, at 3.
60 Modjeska, Current Issues in Labor awg-Foreward"Whose Side Are You On, 41 OHIo ST.
L.J. 273, 274 (1980).
61 See, e.g., Bernstein, supranote 14, at 3 ("The modern day 'labor relations consultant' is an
important force in the recent upsurge of sophisticated anti-union activity."). See also I Hearings,
supra note 4, at 40-41 (Kistler statement); id at 102 (Mills statement); id at 189 (Turner
statement).
62 See, e.g., id at 26 & n. I (Kistler statement) (describing the goal of employers as a "union
free environment" and asserting that the National Association of Manufacturers created an entity
called Council on Union Free Environment).
63 See, e.g., id at 74-118 (statement of Herbert G. Melnick, Chairman of the Board of Modern
Management, Inc.). See also supra note 10.
64 See supra note 61.
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campaign practices is not known. What is known is that some employers are willing to violate the law, through discharge or other forms of
intimidation, in order to defeat a union. 65 It is also known that at least
some of those, perhaps most, utilize the services of a management consultant or management attorney. 66 Those facts do not, however, establish that the consultant or attorney counselled or was otherwise
involved in the unlawful activity. Part of the difficulty is the failure of
the Board's General Counsel to prosecute vigorously even those consultants who have clearly engaged in unlawful activities. 67 Since prosecutions often center only on the effect of employer conduct, there is
little occasion to investigate the employer's motivation or the role
played by the consultant. 68 The matter is further complicated by the
labor movement's branding as "union busting" even those employer
counter-measures that clearly do not violate the Act, though they might
be effective in dissuading potential union members.
Despite the absence of much empirical data, the cases support two
observations: first, that consultants often have advised or encouraged
their management clients to fight unionization through unlawful means
or have participated themselves in illegal activity on behalf of their cli65 Among the interesting findings of a recent empirical study is that employers who are represented by consultants are more likely to engage in unlawful discriminatory conduct than those
who are not. Cooper, Authorization Cardsand Union RepresentationElection Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U.L.
REV. 87, 126 (1984).
66 The NLRB does not maintain any record of consultant or attorney involvement in union
organizational campaigns. 4 Hearings, supra note 4, at 23 (testimony of William A. Lubbers,
General Counsel, NLRB). Nor does the Department of Labor maintain reliable figures since few
management representatives report under the Labor Management Relations and Disclosure Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-532 (1982). See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 11-41. However, the AFL-CIO
estimates that lawyers and consultants plan strategy and influence workers directly in two-thirds
of all NLRB elections. 1 Hearings,supra note 4, at 33 (Kistler statement).
67 See infra text accompanying notes 105-22.
68 For example, in the typical section 8(a)(l) violation, the Board is concerned only with
whether the effect of the employer's action has been to interfere with, coerce or restrain employees
in the exercise of their section 7 rights. Indeed, it is not even necessary to demonstrate that particular employees were coerced-only that the employer's activity would tend to coerce employees.
See. e.g., R. GORMAN, supra note 40, at 132-33. Even in section 8(a)(3) cases where proof of
unlawful discrimination is thought to compel consideration of the employer's motive, the General
Counsel's burden is merely to establish a prima facie showing that union activity was a motivating
factor in the employer's conduct. The burden then shifts to the employer to justify its action by
establishing that its action would have been the same even in the absence of employee protected
activity. See NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2469 (1983); Wright Line, 251
N.L.R.B. 1083, 1087 (1980) enforcement grante 662 F.2d 899 (ist Cir. 1981). Although motive
remains an element in most section 8(a)(3) cases, but see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26 (1967), shifting the burden to the employer to explain its conduct reduces the General
Counsel's need to explore and prove motive. For the motive requirement in section 8(a)(3) generally, see Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLR4 and the Effort to Insulate FreeEmployee Choice,32
U. Cm. L. REV. 735 (1965).
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ents; 69 and second, that attorneys and consultants often assume com69 See, e.g., NLRB v. Mangurian's, Inc., 566 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1978), enforcing 227 N.L.R.B.
113 (1976) (consultant threatened plant closing); NLRB v. Tom Wood Pontiac, Inc., 447 F.2d 838
(7th Cir. 1971), enforcing 179 N.L.R.B. 581 (1969) (consultant unlawfully questioned employees
and solicited grievances); NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros., Packers, 375 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967) (attorney
coercively interrogated employees); Certain-Teed Insulation Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1561 (1980) (industrial psychologist solicited grievances and interrogated employees about union sympathies):
B.L.K. Steel Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. 1347 (1979) (consultants from West Coast Industrial Relations
Association (WCIRA) solicited grievances, interrogated employees, denied benefits, threatened a
loss of benefits, attributed a loss of benefits to the union, instructed a supervisor to interrogate an
employee, paid an employee to influence his vote, and promised an employee a raise if the union
lost the election); Plastic Film Prods. Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 135 (1978) (consultant Rayford Blankenship threatened employees, particularly with plant closure, and also interrogated employees);
Electri-Flex Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 713 (1978) (consultant violated section 8(a)(l) by interrogating
employee); Easy-Heat Wirekraft, 238 N.L.R.B. 1695 (1978) (attorney furnished unlawful assistance to in-house employee committee, leading to violation of section 8(a)(2)); Meyer Stamping &
Mfg. Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1978) (consultant Rayford Blankenship threatened and interrogated
employees); Westminister Community Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 185 (1975) (attorney-consultant Fred
Long of WCIRA threatened employees during speeches in a decertification proceeding); G.T.E.
Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973) (John Sheridan and Associates, counsulting firm hired to
help combat the union, instructed supervisors to engage in unlawful surveillance and advised
supervisors to fire union activists within the first 90 days); Sterling Faucet Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1031
(1973)(activities of psychological testing firm); Schweigers, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 420 (1963) (attorney
incorrectly advised firm to withdraw recognition of the union); The Miller Press, 197 N.L.R.B. 574
(1972) (survey of psychological testing firm violates section 8(a)(1)); Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 546 (1970) (consultant unlawfully promised benefits and conspired to prohibit an employee from voting in an NLRB election); Ridgewood Mgt. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 148,
enforced,410 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1969); Automotive Warehouse Distrib., 171 N.L.R.B. 638 (1968)
(attorney coercively interrogated employees following issuance of a complaint); Southland Cork
Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 906, enforced in part,342 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1965) (attorney delayed negotiations, resulting in unfair labor practice finding against employer); Lozano Enters., 143 N.L.R.B.
1347 (1963) (attorney withheld executed contract from union, resulting in filing of decertification
petition eleven days after certification year expired); Guild Indus. Mfg. Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 1719,
enforcement denied inpert.part,321 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1963) (attorney Paul Saad unlawfully interrogated employees in violation of section 8(a)(l)); National Welders Supply Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 660
(1961) (consultants interrogated employees and potential employees with respect to their union
activities and sympathies); National Lime & Stone Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 282 (1945) (consultants found
to have committed unfair labor practices during course of union organizational campaign). See
also infra notes 96 & 98 (cases involving consultant Gladys Selvin).
Since attorneys and consultants have not often been charged individually as a result of their
activities, it is difficult to find cases that detail, or even report their activities. Many of the above
cases were located conducting a Lexis computer search, using the consultants' names as key
words. Such a technique is obviously inefficient. First, there is no exhaustive list of either management attorneys or consultants, thus making any such search random at best. Second, Lexis will
locate a case only if the consultant's name appears therein, thereby excluding those cases in which
a consultant may have engaged in questionable conduct, but was not named by either the A.L.J.
or the Board. Finally, Lexis files will only search back to 1972.
In addition to the cases cited above, many cases exist in which an employer was found guilty
of unfair labor practices and an attorney or consultant was somehow involved. These cases, however, do not detail the extent of the consultant's involvement, if any, in the unlawful conduct. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Lehigh Lumber, 94 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13,574 (3d Cir. 1982) (attorney served as
chief negotiator in case in which employer was found in contempt for violation of NLRB bargaining order). See also Maietta Contracting, 265 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1982) (attorney bargaining for em-
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plete or major responsibility for management's campaign against the
union. 70 In the latter case, whether encouraged by consultants or not,
ployer found guilty of section 8(a)(5) violation, as well as other unfair labor practices); Parkview
Nursing Center II Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 243 (1982) (Rayford Blankenship, Consultant); Vore Cinema Corp. 254 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1981) (same); Humana Corp., 254 N.L.R.B. 1377 (1981) (charges
filed against WCIRA, but case settled before trial); Columbia Bldg. Materials, 239 N.L.R.B. 1342
(1979) (Fred Long, WCIRA, attorney-consultant); Ohio City Mfg., Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 965 (1978)
(Rayford Blankenship, consultant); Pease Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1978) (attorney Carl Becker,
chief negotiator for an employer who "entered into and continued contract negotiations with the
union with a closed mind, having determined that it would not negotiate a contract except on its
own terms, which it knew would be unacceptable to the union and would force the union to
strike" in order to force decertification); Indio Community Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. 129, 136 (1976)
(consultant Fred Long referred to by AL as the one who "orchestrat[ed] the anti-union campaign); Clear Lake Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1 (1976) (Fred Long, WCIRA, consultant and attorney);
GTE Automatic Elec., 204 N.L.R.B. 716, 739 (1973) (consultant John Sheridan represented what
the ALJ referred to as a "recidivist" employer who had a "proclivity to engage in long-range and
carefully planned unfair labor practices which go to the very heart of the Act"); San Luis Obispo
County and N. Santa Barbara County Restaurant & Tavern Ass'n, 196 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1084, 1087
(1972) (section 8(a)(5) violation for unlawfully withdrawing recognition from the union after the
hiring of consultant E.J. Gund and Associates. The A.L.J. suggested that the employer had hired
Gund because of his reputation for successfully ridding restaurant employees of unions).
In addition to the reported cases, there are at least some other indications of management
representatives' willingness to misuse the law to resist unions. Some of the references are anecdotal. Thus, many of the union witnesses at the 1979-1980 Hearings, supra note 4, testified as to their
experiences with consultants. E.g., supra notes 8, 9 & 61. See also The Labor Movement at the
Crossroads, The Strengths and Weaknesses of Compulsory Unionism, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE, 29 40 (1982-1983). Professor Eilene Silverstein commented that: "All of my students
who are looking for jobs in the labor field tell me, union busting is the single growth industry.
That's the place where there are labor law jobs." This author's experiences are quite similar. For
example, a management attorney once patiently explained that he had refused to hire a student
because he had expressed reluctance to advise employers to discharge union adherents. "Why
don't you teach them what the world is really like," the lawyer said. For an account in the popular
press, see Brill, supra note 3, at 17, in which lawyer Whiteford Blakeney is reported to have told
J.P. Stevens Company officials: "You do what you think you have to do, and I'll hold off that
damned labor board if they come after you."
Management seminars and publications provide additional evidence that management representatives sometimes encourage law breaking. The best example is a surreptitiously-made tape
recording of a speech made by Fred Long, Chairman of West Coast Industrial Relations Association, in which he allegedly advised management representatives to backdate memoranda in order
to grant wage increases and not to worry about the possibility of perjury since "there is no such
thing as perjury in a Labor Board proceeding." I Hearings,supra note 4, at 205, 212. Replying to
the charges, Long denied any wrongdoing in a statement reprinted at 3 id. at 283.
Advice also comes in other forms. The author has received, and has available, a slide presentation entitled "Union Organizing Game," prepared by Labor Relations Associates, Inc. The
material is intended as a training program for supervisors. Although most of the instruction offered is lawful, the author was struck by the tone of the presentation, and its obvious intention to
make supervisors fear the prospect of unionization. Even though supervisors are constantly admonished not to spy on employees, the slide presentation encourages them to obtain information
to report to management.
70 The best example of consultant control over management activities is found in St. Francis
Hospital, 263 N.L.R.B. 834 (1982), discussed infra text accompanying notes 100-61. As in those
instances involving the possibility of unlawful conduct or advice, supra note 69, it is often difficult
to discover from the case reports the extent of a consultant's control over the campaign. The
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unfair labor practices do occur. In either case, General Counsel prosecutions and NLRB remedies center on employers. Although there are

a few cases in which consultants or attorneys proven to have engaged in
unlawful activity have been the subject of Board action, in the ordinary
case the Board's enforcement efforts ignore the consultant, even if the

consultant's unlawful conduct was both overt and serious.
In Westminister Community Hospital,7 1 for example, attorney-consultant Fred Long, from the well known consulting firm of West Coast
Industrial Relations Association (WCIRA), 72 addressed a group of em-

ployees during a decertification campaign. Long threatened the employees by telling them that if they voted to retain the union he would
limit the size of their wage increase and that he would negotiate a

"lousy" contract and shove it down their throats and into other portions of their anatomy. 73 Long's conduct resulted in a finding of unfair
labor practices against the employer.74 Neither Long nor the consulting
firm was named as a respondent. Similarly, in BLK Steel,75 consultants
from WCIRA were involved in particularly egregious conduct. Consultants threatened employees with discharge, solicited grievances,
threatened loss of benefits, predicted that adverse consequences would

follow unionization, attributed a loss of business to the union,
Board has concentrated primarily on employers, who are liable on an agency theory. See infra
text accompanying notes 89-99. Nonetheless, there are cases in addition to St. Francis which
demonstrate consultant control. See, e.g., Shelly & Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497
F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1974), enforcing 199 N.L.R.B. 250 (1972) (Gladys Selvin, consultant, exercised
significant control over employer's response to the union organizational effort); Catalina Yachts,
250 N.L.R.B. 283 (1980); Maine Medical Center, 248 N.L.R.B. 707 (1980) (no unfair labor practices were found, although the ALl noted that the consulting firm of Modem Management Methods, Inc., had been hired "to plan and conduct a massive anti-union campaign in respondent's
behalf and to advise respondent's supervisors how they could aid in disseminating respondent's
anti-union message... within the confines of the law); Plastic Film Prods., 238 N.L.R.B. at 143
(A.L.J. found that consultant Rayford Blankenship "planned respondent's anti-union campaign");
Indio Community Hosp., 225 N.L.R.B. at 136 (consultant Fred Long referred to as having
"orchestrated" the anti-union campaign); GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. at 928 (personnel
manager testified that the consultant Sheridan and Associates had taken over the union resistance
campaign to such an extent that he "voided [himself] from that area"); Monroe Auto Equip. Co.,
153 N.L.R.B. 912 (1965) (consultant alleged to have planned strategy of discharging union activists in order to delay election and coerce employees); National Welders, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. at 667
("as the campaign progressed [the consultant] appears to have assumed more direction of the
company's quest for information").
71 221 N.L.R.B. 185 (1975), enforcedmem., 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3240 (9th Cir. 1977).
72 Both Long and the activities of WCIRA were the subject of inquiry in the 1978-1980 Hearings. See, e.g., I Hearings,supra note 4, at 194-202 (statement of Joel Smith), which includes a
transcript of a tape recording of a seminar conducted by Long on July 28, 1976, as well as certain
literature accompanying Long's presentation. Id at 203-90. Long himself also testified at the
Hearings. 3 Id at 304.
73 221 N.L.R.B. at 190.
74 Id at 186.
75 245 N.L.R.B. 1347 (1979).
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threatened to close the plant,7 6 interrogated an employee with respect
to his union sympathies, promised the same employee a benefit if the
union lost the election, and, ultimately, paid that employee $60 in order
to influence his vote.77 A consultant also instructed a supervisor to interrogate an employee. 78 Despite the extensive involvement of
WCIRA in the campaign and its agents' commission of unfair labor
practices, the consulting firm was not named as a party respondent.
79
Instead, the employer was found liable for the acts of WCIRA.
Certainly, an employer should be liable for the actions of its agents
during the course of an organizing campaign. This is true whether the
agents are regularly employed, such as supervisors, or are independent
contractors, such as consultants or attorneys.80 The Act itself defines
an employer in section 2(3) as including "any person acting as an agent
of an employer, directly or indirectly." 8 ' The theory is obvious: employers should not be able to escape the consequences of the activity
they sponsor, whether committed by them or by others in their interest.8 2 Indeed, the Act makes clear that the employer is responsible for
actions taken in its behalf, whether or not specifically authorized.
Thus, section 2(13) provides: "In determining whether any person is
acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be
controlling."8 3 The controversial question, however, is not whether the
employer should be responsible for the acts of its consultant-agents, but
whether those consultants should share that liability in their .own right.
Despite the Board's reluctance to proceed against them, there exist
no strong reasons of law or policy to exempt lawbreaking consultants
from responsibility for their conduct. Although management consultants and attorneys clearly are not responsible for all employer violations, the cases demonstrate that these representatives often provide the
impetus for, and indeed participate in unlawful anti-union campaigns.
In a significant number of cases, consultants have at least shared in the
responsibility for violations of employee rights. Moreover, the law as
76 1d at 1347, 1352.
77 fd at 1349.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1352-53.

80 The term "independent contractor" is used in contrast with "servant." The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1957), states that an independent contractor "may or may not be an
agent." See also W. SEAVEY, AGENCY 8 (1964) ("For agency purposes, any one who acts for, or
contracts with, the principal other than as a servant, is an independent contractor. . . . Included
in the group of independent contractors who are agents are attorneys. . . and other similar persons who conduct transactions for the principal.")
81 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
82 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
83 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1982).
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currently administered furnishes incentives for them to do just that. As
already noted, remedial orders against employers are of limited effect
and, even when enforced, often do not deny to employers the gain
achieved by their unlawful conduct. Since the consultant who encouraged, planned, and even participated in the campaign is usually
ignored by the Board, he is free to act largely without fear of direct
sanction. The' only threat is to the consultant's client, but even then
any unfair labor practice liability will be of slight discomfort compared
to the advantage gained from the unlawful campaign. The only consequences to the consultant are a substantial fee, the admiration and recommendation of his client, and the knowledge that his tactics have
worked and can be used again in campaigns for other clients.
The Board's reluctance to prosecute does not alone account for the
growth of the consultant industry. Its quiescence, however, has no
doubt encouraged some consultants to manipulate Board processes and
otherwise disregard the law. The inevitable result has been an increase
in employer resistance to unionization and a surge of questionable
campaign tactics. Prosecuting consultants and attorneys who break the
law or-advise others to do so will not eliminate employer unfair labor
practices, but such increased regulation can remove some of the impetus and opportunity for employers to violate employee rights. Rather4
than speculate about the unfavorable effects of such prosecutions
while paying lip service to the interests of employees and unions, the
Board should acknowledge that unlawful conduct on the part of management representatives poses a serious threat to the purposes and policies of the Act and take action against the offenders.
III. THE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Merely recognizing the problems posed by management consultants does not give the Board license to proceed against them. Board
sanctions are effected only through unfair labor practice proceedings,
and such offenses can be committed only by "employers. '8 5 In order
for the Board to proceed against lawbreaking consultants, then, it must
bring them within the Act's definition of employer. Even though such
counselors do not stand in an employment relationship with the employees whose rights are violated, both the statute and prior Board decisions furnish an adequate theoretical basis for treating consultants
and attorneys as employers, subject to the unfair labor practice jurisdic-

tion of the National Labor Relations Board. As the following discus84 See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
85 Section 8(a) of the Act provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer"
to commit the acts prohibited by subsections (1) through (5). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982) (emphasis
added.) "Employer" is defined in section 2(2). See supra text accompanying note 81. Unions, too.
can commit unfair labor practices, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1982), but it is unlikely that a management representative could meet the Act's definition of "labor organization." See id § 152(5).
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sion demonstrates, consultants can achieve employer status either
because they are agents, because they exercise significant control over
the campaign, or because they independently satisfy the definition of
"employer" and violate the rights of their clients' employees.
A.

Liability Under Agency Theory

Any attempt to require that attorneys or consultants share in the
unfair labor practice liability of their clients must take account of the
various roles played by such representatives. Typically, one might expect attorneys and consultants to fill an advisory role, helping the employer plan a resistance strategy and giving advice, both legal and
practical, about certain employer action. Strictly speaking, such advisors are not agents for purposes of unfair labor practice liability since
they have not been authorized to act on behalf of the employer, but are
merely paid for advice.8 6 Consultants and attorneys can, however,
serve in an agency relationship. It is not uncommon, for example, for
attorneys or consultants to give speeches to employees, interrogate employees, or serve as spokespersons in collective bargaining. Their authority to act for the employer may be even more extensive. In one
recent case, the General Counsel alleged that a consultant assumed virtually complete responsibility for planning and implementing the employer's resistance to a union organization effort. 87 Although the
administrative law judge found evidence of extensive involvement by
the consultant, he declined to recommend unfair labor practice responsibility, reasoning that at most, the consultant had merely advised
the
88
employer, who retained ultimate responsibility for the campaign.
A consultant's employer status is most easily established in those
cases that clearly demonstrate an agency relationship. Section 2(2) of
the Act provides that "the term 'employer' includes any person acting
as an agent of the employer. '8 9 Thus, those who act as agents not only
bind their principals but also, for purposes of the Board's jurisdiction,
become employers themselves, amenable to the unfair labor practice
provisions of the Act. Although Board action against such agents can
hardly be described as aggressive, it has, on occasion, issued remedial
orders against consultants and attorneys who have acted in direct contact with employees on behalf of client-employers. Sometimes, the order names the consultant, not as an employer in its own right, but
merely as an agent of the employer. In Meyer's Stamping and Manufacturing Co.,90 for example, consultant Rayford Blankenship repeat86
87
88
89

See infra text accompanying notes 161-70.
St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. 834 (1982).
Id at 849.
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).

90 237 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1978).
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edly threatened employees with closure of the business 9 t and
interrogated a number of employees. 92 In addition, there were other

unfair labor practices that were not directly attributable to Blanken-

ship. 93 The Board's order ran against Meyer's Stamping and Manufac-

94
turing, as well as its "officers, agents, successors, and assigns."

However, as part of the affirmative action ordered by the Board, Blank-

enship was required to sign the notice that was to be posted for employees.95 Blankenship's liability, then, was limited to his status as an agent
of the employer.

The Board has treated agents as employers in their own right,
however. The most frequently cited examples are several cases involv96
ing the near-legendary Gladys Selvin, a California based consultant.
In West Coast Liquidators andMrs. Selvin,97 Selvin was named sepa-

rately as a respondent because of her outrageous delaying tactics during collective bargaining. 9 8 The Board ordered her to cease and desist

91 The Board found that, among other things, Blankenship told the employees "that the Company was operating in the 'red;' that [the owner] could sell the business and live off the interest;
that the Company could close its doors, and there would be no work for anyone; and that if
business continued to fall there would be more layoffs." Id at 1322. For a more detailed account
of Blankenship's activities, see id. at 1329-30.
92 Id at 1331.
93 The Board found that the employer discriminatorily laid off employees in violation of section 8(a)(3). Id at 1322-24.
94 Id at 1324.
95 Id at 1334.
96 In addition to West Coast, Ms. Selvin was involved in at least 10 other cases decided by the
Board: Shelly & Anderson Furniture & Mfg. Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 250 (1972), enforced 497 F.2d
1200 (9th Cir. 1974); Chalk Metal Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1133 (1972); Inter-Polymer Indus., 196
N.L.R.B. 729 (1972), petition denied, 480 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1973); West Coast Casket Co., 192
N.L.R.B. 624 (1971), enforcedinpert.part,469 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1972); KFXM Broadcasting Co.,
183 N.L.R.B. 1187 (1970); Sir James, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 256 (1970), enforced 446 F.2d 570 (9th
Cir. 1971); Architectural Fiberglass, 165 N.L.R.B. 238 (1967); Duro Fittings Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
653 (1961); California Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209 (1966); and Duro Fittings Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
377 (1958).
Ms. Selvin's tactics were well known to the Board. In 1964 an NLRB trial examiner observed
that "her reputation ... in the field of labor relations is so notorious that one may well question
whether any employer desirous of establishing a mutually satisfactory bargaining relationship
with his employees' representative would designate her as his negotiator." Local 986, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 145 N.L.R.B. 1511, 1519 (1964).
97 205 N.L.R.B. 512, enforced 527 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1973).
98 Ms. Selvin's actions in West Coast were typical of those in other cases. Selvin represented
West Coast in contract negotiations. Id at 513. As was not unusual, she conducted negotiations
in her apartment. See, e.g., West Coast Casket, 192 N.L.R.B. at 632-33. Ms. Selvin arrived late,
frequently reminisced or otherwise changed the subject so that no more than 45 minutes of actual
negotiation occurred in any of the three bargaining sessions, refused to furnish information, summarily rejected most union proposals, never presented any counterproposals, and refused to meet
between November 17 and January because she was expecting company for Thanksgiving. She
did, however, approve a clause that read, in its entirety: "The company and the Union acting by
their duly authorized representatives agree as follows." She also told the union that, for the previous 10 to 12 years, none of her clients had signed a contract. West Coast Liqs. and Mrs. Selvin,
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from unlawful activities, not only in her relationship with the respondent employer, but "when she is an agent. . . for any other employer

subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board." 99
Selvin's status as an employer subject to Board jurisdiction, then, was
the result of her agency relationship with her client.
B.

Liability Through Control

Although the Board has proceeded directly against consultants on
a few occasions, it has refused to venture beyond the agency theory
applied in the Selvin cases, despite the recent urgings of its General
1 00 the employer
Counsel. In St. FrancisHospital,
hired the well-known

management consulting firm of Modem Management, Inc. (popularly
known as 2M) to1 to direct its response to a union organizational effort.
The administrative law judge found that the hospital repeatedly had
violated section 8(a)(1) by engaging in "an intensive, high pressured,
systematic antiunion campaign" replete with frequent unlawful interro-

gation by supervisors, threats of reprisal, and promises of benefits. 0 2

205 N.L.R.B. at 513-15. The administrative law judge concluded: "It is. . .clear.., that Mrs.
Selvin lacked sufficient knowledge of the Employer's operations to engage in meaningful collective bargaining." Id.at 515.
99 Id at 516. For a further discussion of this broad or blanket order, see infra note 208.
100 263 N.L.R.B. 834 (1982).
101 Id at 836 n.12. Modem Management received considerable attention at the 1979-1980
Hearings. See, e.g., 1 Hearings,supranote 4, at 108-112 (Mills statement); id. at 423-25 (Georgine
statement); 3 id. at 4 (Donlon statement); id. at 7 (Hammil statement); id. at 172 (Muehlenkamp
statement).
Representatives of Modem Management also testified. Id at 74-118 (Melnick statement).
Modern Management has undergone several name changes. Itis also known as Modem Management Methods, Melnick, McKeon & Mickus, Inc., or 3M. Id at 95-96 (letter from Richard Hunsucker, Acting Director, Office of Labor Management Standards Enforcement, Labor
Management Services Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, (April 3, 1980)). One witness
at the 1979-1980 Hearings suggested that 3M should stand for "medieval management methods."
3 Hearings,supra note 4, at 177 (Muehlenkamp statement).
102 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 844. While disagreeing with some specific findings of the
administrative law judge and, in particular, his finding that the campaign in its entirety violated
section 8(a)(l), the Board sustained the recommended bargaining order, concluding: "From the
very day that the Union filed its election petition with the Board's Regional Office, the Hospital
embarked on a course of retaliatory unfair labor practices." Id at 836.
On or about June 19, 1979, the Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals
(FNHP) instituted its organizational campaign. By soliciting signatures to FNHP membership
cards, the FNHP had, by August 17, obtained a card majority. Id.at 839. On August 23, 1979,
the FNHP petitioned for an election that was subsequently set for October 26 of that year. Also in
August, 1979, St. Francis Hospital contracted for the services of 2M. At that time, the chairman of
the board and the president of St. Francis introduced 2M's representatives to the hospital's administrative and supervisory personnel. Id. at 847. By early September, four of 2M's representatives
had established offices within the hospital and were using the hospital's support resources, including secretaries. Id.
Once 2M had established on-location offices, it took nearly full control of the dealings of
supervisory and administrative personnel with rank and file nurses. Id at 848. Throughout the
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The hospital was held responsible for each unfair labor practice. 0 3
In addition, the General Counsel contended that 2M should share re-

sponsibility for most of the unfair labor practices because it "was responsible for and controlled the antiunion campaign" and therefore
4
was at least a "co-principal and/or co-manager" of the campaign. 0
Since there was no evidence presented that 2M had dealt with employees itself, the issue was whether the unlawful acts committed by St.

Francis's supervisors could somehow be attributed to 2M, thus subjecting it to unfair labor practice liability as an "employer" under the
NLRA.
The initial charge against 2M alleged liability, in part, because the

consulting firm had acted as an agent of the hospital. The Regional
Director dismissed the charge, noting that 2M had not been given

"complete authority" to act for the hospital. 05 A complaint was filed,
period of time before the election, 2M called and conducted morning meetings with small groups
of supervisors wherein: (1) supervisors were directed to discuss the campaign with individual
employees; (2) antiunion literature was given to supervisors for dissemination among the employees; (3) supervisors were directed to report back the nature of individual employees' responses;
and (4) the general shape of the antiunion campaign was formulated. Id at 848. Significantly, no
hospital personnel took any part in the direction of the hospital's antiunion campaign and, in fact,
such personnel affirmatively referred questions about the campaign to 2M representatives. Id.
During the weeks immediately preceding the October 26 election, 2M's morning meetings with
supervisory personnel became daily events. Id at 847.
St. Francis' supervisory personnel committed numerous unfair labor practices while under
the direction of 2M, id. at 848, including instances of coercive interrogation, threats, and promises
of benefits. Interrogations of employers following 2M's morning meetings were so widespread that
one employee testified:
It got to be that you knew that they were going to go to the meetings in the mornings and
you knew that at some time during the day you were going to be approached and they would
take you aside and you know, give you the same kind of (anti-union) talk.
Id at 842. Patients and bereaved relatives were not spared: one supervisor exhorted a group of
nurses to vote responsibly, while the nurses were tending to and consoling the family of a recently
deceased patient. Id. at 843.
Promises of benefit and threats of reprisal from supervisors were equally pervasive. Several
supervisors told staff nurses that the recently hired hospital administrator would remedy the
problems which were the basis of the employees' desire to organize. Id. at 841. Threats of reprisal
ranged from several incidents of supervisors telling nurses that the channels of communications
between them would be impeded, id. at 842, to intimations that terms of employment would be
worse if the union won the election, id at 841-42.
The foregoing was set against a background of a coercive wage increase two weeks prior to
the election. Id. at 840. Moreover, the Board adopted the administrative law judge's conclusion
that St. Francis's refusal to allow employees to attend professional development seminars conducted by the unions violated the Act. Id at 845-46.
Notwithstanding the frequency of the 2M morning meetings with supervisors and the finding
that the supervisors' interrogation of employees was "calculated to interfere with the employee's
freedom of choice," id at 851, the judge found that there was "no evidence that [2M had] advised
its client to violate the Act." ld. at 849.
103 Id at 852-53.
104 Id at 847.
105 Id at 847 n.ll.
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however, when the General Counsel abandoned allegations of agency
and proceeded on what the administrative law judge called "a totally
new theory." 10 6 Apparently bowing to the Regional Director's agency
determination, the General Counsel contended that 2M had become an
employer, not as an agent, but by virtue of its control over the
campaign.107
The administrative law judge's findings with respect to 2M's au-

thority and conduct parallels union allegations of 2M actions in other
cases.108 The administrative law judge found that the bulk of the antiunion effort was carried out by supervisors, none of whom had any prior
experience in such an endeavor. 19 Instead, they relied on the consultant's advice and received no direction from hospital administrators
other than to follow the instructions of 2M, which, the administrative

law judge said, had almost complete control of the campaign:
Through its advice and instructions Respondent 2M effectively directed the campaign and established the tactics to be used by the supervisors. It appears that Respondent St. Francis gave Respondent 2M
practically full control of the antiunion campaign. Respondent 2M representatives called the meetings, passed out the literature, and shaped the
strategy of the entire campaign from offices on the hospital premises." 0

Despite the significant involvement of 2M in the planning and conduct
of the campaign, the administrative law judge declined to recommend

unfair labor practice liability, finding that the consultant had done

nothing more than offer "advice and instructions."' I The Board itself
ignored the issue, other than to observe in a footnote that the hospital
had hired 2M "to conduct its antiunion campaign." 1 2 The D.C. Cir-

cuit enforced the Board's order13without extensive discussion of the issues raised by the consultant.'

106 id at 847.
107 In addition to the A.L.J.'s description of the General Counsel's theory, see also Quarterly
Report of the GeneralCounsel, January 12, 1982, at 6.
108 See supra note 101 (testimony of witnesses).
109 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 848.
11o Id at 848.
111 Id. at 849.

Id at 836 n.12.
The D.C. Circuit's opinion enforcing St. Francis is devoted primarily to a review of the
Board's unfair labor practice findings and its bargaining order remedy. See St. Francis Fed'n of
Nurses v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The court's treatment of the involvement and
potential liability of 2M is cursory at best. See id at 857-58. The court agreed with the NLRB's
findings that 2M directed the antiunion campaign, that supervisors were the principal means
through which the campaign was implemented, and that the hospital had instructed the supervisors to heed 2M's advice and instructions. 2M escaped liability, however, because the court found
substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that 2M did not counsel unlawful conduct.
Id at 858.
Although the court's failure to sanction 2M is disappointing, its opinion is not that significant.
The court seemed most concerned with the lack of evidence pointing to direct participation in
wrongdoing and with the General Counsel's failure to establish (or even allege) an agency rela112
113
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Although the General Counsel did not proceed on an agency the-

ory, the administrative law judge seemed most persuaded by the lack of
a common law agency relationship. Thus, he emphasized that ultimate

responsibility should be borne by the hospital since it, not the consultant, controlled the employment of the supervisors: the supervisors followed the instructions of 2M only because they were directed to do so
by the hospital, and any discipline for failing to follow orders would be

imposed by the hospital, not the consultant." 14 In short, the administrative law judge decided that there was not sufficient proof of consultant
control over supervisor employment to find that 2M was the hospital's

agent in its dealing with them. Nor was any such relationship established with respect to authority over employees, since the evidence
5
failed to demonstrate any incidents of direct employee contact."

As demonstrated above, there is little difficulty in finding agency
when a consultant acts on behalf of the employer, having direct contact
with employees or employee representatives. In St. Francis2M urged,

with apparent agreement from both the administrative law judge and
the General Counsel, that such contact is essential to an agency relationship. It virtually ignored the control theory, noting only that the hospital retained "ultimate
authority." Id. As argued elsewhere in this Article, the fact that the hospital remained ultimately
responsible for its employees should not be dispositive when a consultant controls the campaign.
The General Counsel's focus on the control or agency issues, rather than on his co-principal theory, might have yielded different results. In any event, the D.C. Circuit's opinion means nothing
more than that the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)
(1982), and that its interpretation of the Act was reasonable. See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal
Sys., Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 4360, 4362 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984), (citation omitted) in which the Supreme
Court addressed the role of the courts in reviewing NLRB decisions:
We have often reaffirmed that the task of defining the scope of § 7 'is for the Board to
perform in the first instance...' and.., a reasonable construction by the Board is entitled
to considerable deference. . . .The question for decision today is thus narrowed to whether
the Board's application of § 7 [to the facts at issue] is reasonable.
Neither the Board's own opinions nor courts of appeals opinions enforcing their orders preclude a change in position by the Board. In NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), for
example, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the Board's ability to change an interpretation
of the Act that had been accepted by courts of appeals:
We agree that its earlier precedents do not impair the validity of the Board's construction . . . .The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly
fitting. To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the development of this important
aspect of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking . . . .The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.
Id. at 265-66.
Moreover, the Board has often rejected the interpretations of the National Labor Relations
Act found in courts of appeals opinions. See, e.g., St. Agnes Medical Center, 247 N.L.R.B. 1101,
1102 n.3 (1980) ("We respectfully disagree with [the Third Circuit] and adhere to our view until
such time as the Supreme Court has passed on the matter."); Construction, Bldg. Materials &
Miscellaneous Drivers, Local No. 83, 243 N.L.R.B. 328, 330 n.8 (1979) ("We respectfully disagree
with the Tenth Circuit's holding and adhere to the position we expressed [in other cases] until such
time as the Supreme Court has passed on the question.").
"14 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 849-50.
115 Id at 848-49.
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tionship. Indeed, cases cited by 2M in its brief represent instances in
which consultants acted in direct contact with employees on behalf of
the employers and were found to be agents.' 16 In each case the agents
were deemed "employers" as a result of the agency relationship and
found guilty of unfair labor practices in their own right. Those cases,

however, do not establish that direct contact17 with employees is essential
to the creation of an agency relationship."

There clearly was no consultant contact with employees in St.
Francis. Moreover, a principal in the firm testified before a Congressional committee that his firm does not interact for employers with
their employees. 1 8 Unions, too, have complained that 2M's methods

often make it difficult even to discover its participation in the campaign. They allege that 2M stays in the background, seldom surfacing,

but anonymously controlling the employer's response to the organiza-

tional effort."19 Although 2M's presence was known to the St. Francis
employees (indeed, its continued presence was used as a threat against
them), 120 the consultant's other activities would seem to bear out the
labor movement's frequent allegations against the firm. Thus, 2M

planned, and through hospital supervisors implemented, an aggressive,
sometimes unlawful, strategy to defeat the union. Although there was
no evidence that 2M counselled unlawful activity, it controlled a campaign that produced such conduct and, in one instance at least, condoned unlawful interrogation.121 Furthermore, while 2M may not have
116 See id. at 848. The cases cited by 2M were National Welders Supply Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 660
(1961) and Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, 182 N.L.R.B. 546 (1970). In National Welders, the
employer hired a consulting firm named Lee Associates to assist in its campaign against the union.
The consultant unlawfully interrogated both employees and applicants for employment in a campaign described by the administrative law judge as "calculated to uncover all that was to be
learned of the union's progress." National Welders Supply Co., 132 N.L.R.B. at 667-68, 671. In
Sierra Academy, a consultant unlawfully promised benefits during meetings with employees, and
conspired to prevent an employee from voting in an NLRB election. Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, 182 N.L.R.B. at 548-49. In both cases the consultants' liability stemmed from their agency
relationship to the employer, and, in both cases it is clear that the consultants had personal contact
with the employees.
117 That issue, in fact, was not before the Board in either case. In SierraAcademy, the General
Counsel had contended that the consultant violated the Act by advising the employer to commit
an unfair labor practice. The administrative law judge avoided deciding whether such conduct
was unlawful (which may have involved questions of agency) by finding that the allegation was
supported only by uncorroborated hearsay. Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, 182 N.L.R.B. at 552
& n. 13. For a more thorough discussion of the liability of a consultant for giving unlawful advice,
see infra text accompanying notes 161-70.
118 See 3 Hearings,supranote 4, at 76 (Melnick testimony) ("We meet only with members of
management. All our contacts are limited exclusively to management representatives.").
119 See, e.g., 3 id at 111 (Mills statement); id at 177 (Muehlenkamp statement) ("For the most
part. . . consultants are seen only as out-of-state license plates parked in the executive lot."); 1 id
at 636 (Winpensinger statement).
120 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 842.
121 Id at 842. The administrative law judge found that a supervisor interrogated employees
about their union sympathies and reported her findings to 2M, whose representatives did not
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counselled lawbreaking in this particular campaign, the case reports

demonstrate that consultants are not always so restrained. 122
Despite the reticence of the administrative law judge and the Gen-

eral Counsel, it is possible to reach consultants in cases like St. Francis
under an agency theory. Prior to 1947, the Act defined an employer to
include those who act "in the interest of the employer."' 123 This broad
definition sometimes bound the employer to actions of supervisors or
even outsiders, even though "the employer had not authorized what
was said or done, and in many cases even had prohibited it." 124 It also

contrasted conspicuously with provisions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
that established union liability only if the conduct of an agent was authorized or ratified by the union.125 In order to limit employer exposure
and provide equitable treatment against both employers and unions,
the 1947 amendments removed the "interest" language and substituted

the current provision that "employer" includes those acting as agents.
In addition, Congress added section 2(13) to the NLRA, which was

intended to adopt common law agency principles. 126

The amendments, then, were not aimed at cases like St. Francis,

where the consultant was hired and authorized to act by the employer.
Though the amendments protect employers against liability for some of

the actions of outsiders, 127 there was no officious intermeddling in St.
advise her to stop: "The preponderance of the evidence establishes condonation of the alleged
practice by [2M and St. Francis]." Id.
122 See supra note 69.
123 National Labor Relations Act, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 151-166 (1982)).
124 See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947), reprintedin 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 302 (1948).
125 See 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
126 The House Report stated:
The bill, by defining as an 'employer' 'any person acting as an agent of an employer'
makes employers responsible for what people say or do only when it is within the actual or
apparentscope of their authority, and thereby makes the ordinary rules of the law of agency
equally applicable to employers and to unions.
H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 124, at II (emphasis in original). With respect to section 2(13), the
Conference Report says that "both employers and labor organizations will be responsible for the
acts of their agents in accordance with the ordinary common law rules of agency" CONF. REP. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947), reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 540 (1948).

127 There is, however, no requirement that the employer expressly authorize the outsider's conduct. See, e.g., Lake Butler Apparel Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 863 (1966), enforced in pert.part,392 F.2d
76 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the administrative law judge wrote:
[T]he principal's consent, technically called authorization or ratification, may be manifested by conduct, sometimes even passive acquiescence as well as by words. Authority to act
as an agent in a given manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the principal is such to
show that he actually intended to confer that authority.
Id at 873. See also Henry I. Siegal Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 825, 839 (1968) ("even under technical
common law rules, agency through ratification, knowledgeable acceptance or retention of [benefits] . . . or through failure to disavow are firmly recognized"); Dean Industries, 162 N.L.R.B.
1078, 1092 (1967).
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Francis. Rather, the employer invited 2M into its dispute with the
union. It should not matter that 2M had no direct contact with employees. St. Francis essentially entrusted 2M with the operation of a
part of its business: it gave 2M virtually complete authority to plan and
implement the antiunion campaign. At least for that purpose, 2M assumed control over the activities of St. Francis's supervisors. Indeed, it
appears that 2M instructions even took precedence over other supervisory activities. 28 2M, then, became St. Francis's agent for purposes of
the antiunion campaign. It need not have had, as the Regional Director believed, "complete authority" to speak for the employer in "all
situations" involving the union. That is, it need not have contacted the
employees itself. Nor was it necessary that St. Francis supervise 2M's
methods. The fact that St. Francis turned over significant control to
2M and advised its supervisors to follow 2M's instructions should be
enough to establish that 2M was the agent of St. Francis for the purposes of planning and controlling the campaign. 2 9
Within the scope of that agency relationship, 2M had the authority
to use, and in fact used, St. Francis's supervisors to implement its campaign. The General Counsel used that authority to advance the novel
theory that 2M was a coemployer of the supervisors, thus satisfying the
requirement of employer status for purposes of unfair labor practice
liability. The same facts, however, also lead to liability under an
agency analysis. Since 2M was acting within the scope of its authority
in directing the activities of the supervisors, 2M was the agent of St.
Francis for that purpose and the supervisors were, in turn, not the employees, but the agents of 2M. That is, the unfair labor practices committed by the supervisors were attributable to 2M, their principal for
purposes of the campaign. 2M, then, is amenable to the unfair labor
practice procedures of the Act because St. Francis's agency relationship
with 2M qualifies 2M as an "employer," and, as an employer, the unlawful acts of the supervisors are attributable to it.130
This is the case even if 2M were not authorized to direct unfair
labor practices by the supervisors and in fact did not do so. 2M exercised almost complete control over the campaign activities of the supervisors, who were instructed by their employer to follow 2M's directives.
For purposes of the Act (and for common law agency principles), it
does not matter that the supervisors were not authorized to violate the
128 For example, the administrative law judge noted that 2M representatives had authority to
call nurse-supervisors to meetings "without the approval of any of Respondent St. Francis' officials." St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 848.
129 See, e.g., W. SEAVEY, supra note 80, at 2 ("Agency deals with the rules applicable to the
legal relations which arise when two persons agree that one is to act for the benefit of the other in
accordance with the other's directions."). 2M was authorized to act for St. Francis in combating
the threat of union organization. While it is true that St. Francis did not supervise the day to day
activities of 2M, it retained the right to control (or terminate) 2M's conduct.
130 See W. SEAVEY, supra note 80, at 2.
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law. Apparent authority is the key. 13 ' Employers regularly are held
liable for the unauthorized conduct of supervisor-agents. 132 The same
liability should be imposed on a consultant-agent who controls the
campaign, directs the supervisors, helps create the environment that led
to the unfair labor practices and, finally, benefits from their commission. Additionally, in St. Francis,the administrative law judge found
that the consultant knew about the unfair labor practices and condoned
them.
It is true that the relationship asserted here lacks the direct contact
present in typical Board findings of agency. The situation in St. Francis
does not differ greatly, however, from cases in which an agent appoints
a subagent and agrees to be primarily responsible for the subagent's
conduct. 3 3 The primary difference here is that the employer, in effect,
appointed the subagent in the personage of the supervisors. The consultant, however, not only agreed to use the supervisors, but as the
Congressional Hearings revealed, would not have accepted employment under any other condition. In that case, both the agent
and the
principal should be bound by the acts of the supervisors.1 34
The question of 2M's status as agent arises in a context quite unlike that which provoked the 1947 amendments. The concern then was
to limit the liability of employers for certain unauthorized acts of
others by attributing such acts to the employer only on agency principles. In the case of 2M, however, the question is not so much if the acts
can be attributed to the employer, but whether the perpetrator itself can
be considered an employer for purposes of section 8 of the Act. In
131 See, e.g., Lake Butler Apparel Co., 158 N.L.R.B. at 873:
Authority to act as agent in a given manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the
principal is such as to show that he actually intended to confer that authority. Also a principal
may be responsible for the act of his agent. . . even though the principal has not specifically
authorized or indeed may have specifically forbidden the act in question.
See also International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, CIO, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1509
(1948) (Board construed the 1947 amendment with respect to agency and concluded: "It is enough
if the principal actually empowered the agent to represent him in the general area within which
the agent acted."); H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 96 (1979)
("Where there is a finding of apparent authority a principal may be held liable for unauthorized
acts done on his behalf."). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958) defines "apparent
authority" as "[t]he power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third
persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." In St. Francis,the manifestation of 2M's authority was made to
the supervisors, who were ordered to follow the instructions of 2M. St. Francis Hosp., 263
N.L.R.B. at 834.
132 See, e.g., R. GORMAN, Supra note 40, at 134-35.
133 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(l) (1958) states that "[a] subagent is a person
appointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for his
principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be primarily responsible."
134 This interpretation is consistent with that of the Restatement: "The agent of a disclosed or
partially disclosed principal is not subject to liability for the conduct of other agents unless he is at
fault in appointing, supervising,or cooperating with them." Id. § 358(l) (emphasis added).
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making that decision, both the NLRB and the courts have said that
strict principles of agency are not required under sections 2(2) and
2(13).135 In St. Francisthere is no occasion to consider whether the hospital is responsible for the unfair labor practices. Nearly all of the unlawful acts were committed by hospital supervisors within the scope of
their employment, and they clearly are attributable to St. Francis. The
only question is whether unfair labor practice liability can extend not
only to the employer, but also to the consultant who planned and controlled the campaign. In a somewhat different setting, the Supreme
Court has held that questions of agency under the NLRA are to be
construed liberally, not with regard to "technical concepts," but in light
of "clear legislative policy.' 1 36 Although the legislature has not spoken
with respect to liability for consultants, sound public policy dictates
that those who are responsible for violating the law should share in the
liability created by their unlawful acts. In a case like St. Francis,use of
the word "agent" in the definition of employer should not provide a
shield to one as integrally involved in an unlawful campaign as was
2M.
C.

The Independent Employer Theory

In addition to agency, there is another, even more compelling, theory upon which consultants qualify as employers. The Board has recognized that the "employer" who commits an unfair labor practice need
not, in all instances, be the employer of the employees whose rights are
violated. As already indicated, the definition of employer is not particularly illuminating and is devoted primarily to a pronouncement that
the term includes certain persons (namely, agents) and excludes certain
others (for example, government agencies). 13 7 The definition of employee is somewhat more helpful. Section 2(3) provides that "[tlhe
term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer."' 13 In addition, section 2(9)
defines labor dispute as including "any controversy concerning terms,
tenure, or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating . . . or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the dispu39
tants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."'
135 See, e.g., NLRB v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 333 F.2d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 1964); Local
636 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. of
the U.S. & Canada, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Henry I. Siegel Co.,
172 N.L.R.B. 825, 839 n.26 (1968).
136 International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940). The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the continuing validity of this case following the 1947 amendments in NLRB v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 333 F.2d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1964).
137 See supra note 85.

138 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
139 Id § 152(9).
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Using these broad definitions, the Board often has assessed liability

against employers who interfere with employee rights, even though
there is no master-servant relationship between the parties.

In one well-known case, for example, the Board, finding support
from the Supreme Court, upheld a section 8(a)(1) violation against a
shopping center owner, Hudgens, who threatened to have the picketing
employees of a tenant arrested for trespassing. 40 The Board reasoned
that Hudgens was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, was therefore subject to NLRB jurisdiction, and had

violated section 8(a)(1) by interfering with the protected rights of employees.' 4 On review, the Court said:
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for "an employer" to
"restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their section 7 rights.
While Hudgens was not the employer of the employees involved in this
case, it seems undisputed that he was an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of [the Act]. The Board has held that a statutory
"employer" may violate Sec. 8(a)(1) with respect to employees other than
14 2
his own.

In St. Francis,the General Counsel urged a similar theory of lia140 In Scott Hudgens, 192 N.L.R.B. 671 (1971), the Board said that the owner's threats violated
section 8(a)(l). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976),
because of the constitutional issue raised by a private citizen forbidding speech in an area open to
to the general public. See also Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). In Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 520-21, the Court overruled Logan
Valley and held that, despite the public character of the property, the first amendment had no role
to play in Hudgens's actions against the picketers. However, the Court went on to say that even
though Hudgens's action did not violate the employees' constitutional rights, it might violate their
section 7 rights. The Court remanded the case to the Board, with guidance about how to accommodate both Hudgens's and the employees' interests under section 8(a)(l). Id. at 521-23. On
remand, the Board applied the criteria set forth by the Court and found Hudgens in violation of
section 8(a)(l). 230 N.L.R.B. 414 (1977).
141 Scott Hudgens, 192 N.L.R.B. at 672.
142 In observing that the Board had held employers liable for unfair labor practice committed
against other employees, the Supreme Court cited Austin Company, 101 N.L.R.B. 1257 (1952). In
that case, a general contractor cancelled a contract with the Pinkerton Company because the
guards it supplied were not union members. Austin claimed that it could not violate section
8(a)(3) with respect to any but its own employees. The Board said:
[T]he statute, read literally, precludes any employer from discriminating with respect to
any employee, for Section 8(a)(3) does not limit its prohibitions to acts of any employer Pis-avis his own employees. Significantly, other sections of the Act do limit their company to employees of a particular employer. Thus, Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer 'to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees'. ..
The statutory language therefore clearly manifests a congressional intent not to delimit the
scope of Section 8(a)(3) in the manner urged here by Respondent Austin.
Id. at 1258-59.
The Board said that on the facts before it, it was unnecessary to "delineate the extent of the
area" in which an employer could violate the Act without a direct employment relationship. Id. at
1259. Therefore, it did not adopt the "broad rationale" of the trial examiner, who had said:
In establishing a broad national policy in respect to employer-employee relationships, as
set forth in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, Congress proscribed the imposition of employment
conditions which encourage or discourage membership in labor organizations. One who
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bility, reasoning that 2M, independent of any relationship with a client,
was an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the Board and, through

its control over the campaign, had violated the organizational rights of
St. Francis employees. 43 The administrative law judge rejected the
theory, however, holding that an independent employer can violate the

rights of employees other than his own only if that employer has control over the rights alleged to have been violated or directs the commission of the unfair labor practice.' 44 Although the administrative law
judge found that 2M condoned the unlawful action of the supervisors,
there was neither proof nor even an allegation that it had directed the
unlawful acts.' 45 Moreover, the administrative law judge determined
that 2M was a mere advisor to St. Francis and had no power of its own
47
to interfere with employee rights. 146 Thus, citing FabricServices, Inc.1
(where an independent employer interfered with an employee's section

7 rights by ordering him off the property for wearing a union insignia)

and Scott Hudgens 48 (where the independent employer abridged the
section 7 right to picket by threatening arrest), the administrative law
judge found no basis for assessing liability against 2M as an independent employer. That is, the administrative law judge found that 2M
could become an "employer" for purposes of the Act only if it occupied

an agency relationship to St. Francis.
On the basis of his own findings, there is no reason to question the

administrative law judge's conclusions that 2M did not direct the unlawful acts of the supervisors and did not possess the same ability to
finds that his opportunities to work at his trade are circumscribed because he belongs or fails
to belong to a particular labor organization has, of course, suffered a discrimination and it
would seem to follow that the one responsible for the discrimination, if he be amenable to the
Act, has violated its provisions. To hold otherwise would limit the usefulness of the Act and
to that extent defeat its purposes. Little more than a recital of the statutory objective coupled
with Board and Court interpretations is needed to convince that Congress intended all those
within the reach of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Board to conform to the Act's provisions and all those within the definition of employee to receive the protection that the Act
affords. By apt language the force of the Act is not limited to those situations arising between
an employee and his employer.
Id at 1266.
143 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 848. The status of 2M as an "employer" for purposes of
the Act was apparently not contested. Although the Board has jurisdiction "to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice. . . affecting commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982), it
has never exercised all its jurisdiction. The Board exercises discretion by only asserting jurisdiction over employers who meet a certain dollar amount of business in interstate commerce. For
example, the Board will assert jurisdiction over a non-retail business if it has a gross annual outflow or inflow of at least $50,000, a standard that a consulting firm such as 2M no doubt could
meet. For a discussion of the Board's discretionary jurisdiction, see R. GORmAN, supranote 40, at
22-26. Since 1977, the Board has asserted jurisdiction over law firms grossing at least $250,000 per
year. See Foley, Hoag & Elion, 229 N.L.R.B. 456 (1977).
144 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 849.
145 Id at 850.
146 Id at 848-49.
147 190 N.L.R.B. 540 (1971).
148 See supra note 140.
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interfere with section 7 rights as did the employers in Hudgens or
Fabric, who could deny the employees of other employers access to
their property. Nonetheless, the administrative law judge's reading of
prior Board opinions is much too narrow. Although it is true that an
independent employer can violate the Act if it directs the commission
of an unfair labor practice or controls the rights at issue, Fabric does
not say, as the administrative law judge held, that those are the only
instances in which liability can be found.
A review of NLRB actions in other cases is necessary to clarify the
issue. In Dews Construction Corp.,149 for example, a contractor hired a
painting subcontractor who had only two employees. The contractor
had informed the subcontractor that the job was to be "non-union"
and, when he learned that both of the subcontractor's employees had
attended a union meeting, directed the subcontractor to lay off one of
them.' 50 As a result of this clearly discriminatory action, both the subcontractor and the general contractor were found guilty of violating
section 8(a)(3). 1S1 With respect to the general contractor, the Board
said, "An employer violates the Act when it directs, instructs, or orders
another employer with whom it has business dealings to discharge, layoff, transfer, or otherwise affect the working conditions of the latter's
employees because of the union activities of said employees."' 152 In
short, the general contractor's control over the subcontractor gave it the
power to direct the discriminatory discharge, and the Board assessed
liability because the general clearly was responsible for the unlawful
conduct.
In FabricServices, a telephone company employee wearing a pen
holder emblazoned with a union motto was ordered off the premises of
a textile concern, Fabric. Although Fabric was an employer subject to
the jurisdiction of the Board, it defended against the 8(a)(1) charge by
alleging that it could violate the Act only with respect to its own employees. 53 The administrative law judge's opinion, adopted by the
Board, reviewed prior cases and questioned whether or not an independent employer could violate section 8(a)(3) with respect to employees other than its own, since discrimination can only be
"accomplished (or rectified) by the one who has actual and ultimate
control of the hire, tenure, or terms and conditions of employment of
the employees affected thereby."' 154 Whatever the accuracy of that
statement, 155 the administrative law judge had no trouble assessing lia149 231 N.L.R.B. 182 (1977).
150 Id at 182.
151 Id at 183.
152
153
154
155

Id at 182 n.4.
Fabric Servs., Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. at 541.
Id at 542.
See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
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bility against Fabric under section 8(a)(1). He noted that while the absence of a "proximate employer-employee relationship" could be
relevant to the ability of an employer to restrain, interfere, or coerce,
Fabric's ability to limit access to its property gave it control over the
exercise of this section 7 right. Thus, its direction either to remove the
union insignia or to leave "constituted a direct interference with and
156
restraint of [the employee's] protected right."'
These two cases demonstrate the typical situation in which the
Board has assessed unfair labor practice liability against independent
employers. 57 In Fabric, as in Scott Hudgens, the independent employer, by virtue of control over its property, had control over the rights
alleged to have been violated. In Dews, the independent employer had
sufficient control over another employer to direct the commission of an
unlawful act. Generalizing from these cases, the administrative law
judge in St. Francisconcluded that there could be no violation by an
independent employer absent facts establishing either control over employee rights or power to direct the unlawful conduct. This conclusion,
however, ignores the basic policy served by Dews and Fabric.
As noted above, the primary importance of the contractor's ability
to direct the discriminatory discharge in Dews was to establish the responsibility of the general contractor for the infringement of employee
rights. Similarly, in Fabric,the employer's control over its property
emphasized its responsibility for the violation of section 7 rights. In
both cases it is clear that the Board, as a matter of policy, wanted to
assess liability against the employers who had caused an unfair labor
practice. 5 8 In both Dews and Fabricthe immediate employers were
also adjudged liable. 159 If the Board's sole interest was providing a
remedy to the aggrieved employee, liability against the independent
employers would not have been necessary. The Board, then, must have
been motivated to act on the basis of fault.
Once it is acknowledged that the power to direct action or control
rights is important merely as a way of fixing responsibility for unlawful
conduct, it is possible to understand how a labor consultant, as an independent employer, can share liability under the same theory. There
is obviously little difficulty if a consultant is given authority to discharge employees and otherwise control their terms or conditions of
156 Fabric Servs., Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. at 542.
157 See, e.g., A.M. Steigerwald Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1512 (1978); Georgia Pacific Corp., 221
N.L.R.B. 982 (1975).
158 The policy is even more apparent in Georgia Pacfc. During a strike, Georgia Pacific directed one subcontractor to discharge a striking employee. In assessing liability against Georgia
Pacific, the administrative law judge said that "the testimony is clear that Georgia Pacific was
responsible for the discharge." Georgia Pacific Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. at 986. Although it is clear
that Georgia Pacific had the power to order the discharge, the administrative law judge used that
fact to emphasize the company's responsibility for the section 8(a)(3) violation.
159 Dews Constr. Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. at 542-43; Fabric Servs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. at 188-89.
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employment or to direct supervisors to do so. Unfair labor practice liability in those cases involves little, if any, extension of the theory of
Dews and Fabric: the consultant is at fault and therefore responsible
for the violation. In a case like St. Francis,however, liability should
attach even if there is no evidence of authority to act directly against
employees or to direct others to do so.
In St. Francis,the administrative law judge found that 2M had
"practically full control" over the campaign. That campaign, as the
Board itself observed, "was marked by numerous unfair labor practices."1 60 Even if 2M did not plan that conduct, section 8(a)(1) does not
require such deliberate action. It is enough that the campaign had the
effect of coercing, interfering with, or restraining employees in the exercise of their rights. Assessing liability against 2M recognizes that those
who plan and implement a campaign that produces such intimidation
should be held accountable for the consequences. It is true, as the administrative law judge found, that St. Francis hired 2M for advice and
instruction in its campaign against the union. It is also true that the
hospital, as the direct employer of those employees whose rights were
violated, bears responsibility for the campaign and is guilty of unfair
labor practices. The consultant, however, is also guilty. Although 2M
may have been a less direct cause of the unlawful conduct than were
the independent employers in Dews and Fabric,it was no less at fault:
2M controlled the campaign, exercising almost exclusive control over
the supervisors and condoning their unlawful behavior. 2M should be
held responsible for the unfair labor practices that occurred in the environment it created. It is no answer to conclude that St. Francis bears
ultimate responsibility because it chose to accept 2M's advice. St.
Francis certainly is liable. But at least part of the fault, and in this case
perhaps most, was 2M's. Recognizing 2M's employer status for purposes of these unfair labor practices would impose liability on those
responsible for the harm, just as the Board did in Dews and Fabric.
D.

The Problem of UnlawfulAdvice: Liability as Aider andAbettor

In St.Francis,the administrative law judge chose, erroneously, to
characterize the consultant-client relationship as only advisory.
Though that conclusion is not warranted by the facts, it does raise a
significant issue: whether the National Labor Relations Board can assess unfair labor practice liability against an attorney or consultant who
knowingly advises a client to violate the Act, but who neither participates in the violation himself nor exercises significant control over the
campaign. As the administrative law judge 161
acknowledged in St.Francis, the Board has never decided this issue.
160 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 834.
161 Id at 849. The General Counsel had raised the issue previously. Thus, in Sierra Academy
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As with the other cases discussed above, such an advisor can violate section 8 only if he qualifies as an "employer." As previously
demonstrated, both the statute and NLRB decisions have made "employer" determinations on the basis of fault. Thus, the statute creates
employers out of agents in order to bind them personally for the harm
they cause. Similarly, the independent employer theory used in Fabric
and Dews proceeds on the basis of fault. The same principle should

guide the Board in cases against advisors. The advisor who knowingly
counsels unlawful activity should share in the responsibility for the
results.
Such considerations of fault have motivated courts to extend lia-

bility to third parties in other areas. In criminal law, for example, aiders and abettors are punished along with those who actually commit
the crime. 62 The Restatement of Torts declares that one may be liable
for harm to a third person from the tortious acts of another if he
"knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself."' 163

This latter definition has been particularly persuasive in the area

of securities regulation. In assessing liability against third parties as
aiders and abettors, the courts have generally required: (1) that some

other party committed an independent law violation; (2) that the aider
and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the conduct that constituted the violation; and (3) that the aider and abettor knew that his

role was part of an improper activity. 64 In addition to borrowing torts
principles, courts have been guided by the underlying policy of protect-

of Aeronautics, 182 N.L.R.B. 546 (1970), the administrative law judge avoided consideration of
the issue because the allegation was supported only by uncorroborated hearsay. See supra note
117.
162 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1962), which provides in part:
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the
conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when... (c) he is an
accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense.
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if- (a)
with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he (i) solicits
such other person to commit it;
or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
planning or committing it ....
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 502-22 (1972) (A third party can be held
liable as an accomplice if he assits or encourages another intending that the crime be committed,
even if the third party could not possibly commit the crime).
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1976) (emphasis added). The comment to
that clause says, in part: "Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a
tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious, it has the same effect upon the liability of the advisor as participation or physical assistance." Id comment d.
164 See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURIFIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 1200 n.
57 (5th ed. 1982). See also Ruder, Muitiole Defendants in Securities Law FraudCases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy,In Pad Dilecto, Indemn#Fcation,and Contributionr 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597,
620-47 (1972).
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ing investors against unlawful schemes. Thus, in Brennan v. Midwestern United Lffe Insurance Co.,1 65 the court sustained a cause of action

against a corporation for aiding and abetting the illegal activity of a
brokerage firm: "Violations of this rule should be 'fashioned case by
case as particular facts dictate.' 1,66 None of these requirements, used
successfully by the courts in securities regulation, would pose a substantial obstacle to assessing liability under an aider and abettor
theory
67

against a labor consultant who counsels unlawful conduct.'
Liability is proposed here only in those cases in which an employer has committed an unfair labor practice, acting on the advice or

instructions of an advisor who knew, or should have known, that the

proposed action was unlawful. In some cases, the unfair labor practice
might occur solely at the urging of the advisor. Even if he merely suggests the unlawful course of conduct, however, he has played an integral role in the violation and should share the responsibility. In such
cases the Board should, just as the court did in Brennan, interpret the
statute flexibly so as to implement its purposes and policies. The Board
has already recognized, through cases like Dews and Fabric,that one
policy of the Act is to prosecute those responsible for unlawful conduct.
Its enforcement effort should be no less vigorous where the unlawful
conduct stems directly from advice given by an attorney or consultant.
At least for purposes of that unfair practice, no harm is done to the

statute by considering such advisors to be "employers" amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Board.
Advisors can be expected to argue that Board action against them
for counseling unfair labor practices is unfair in view of the instability
of many NLRB decisions. Any student of the Board must concede that
NLRB decisions are often too vague and its actions often too fickle for
counselors to act with great confidence.' 68 However, the likelihood of

165 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
166 Id at 155 (quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1963)).
167 At least one court has recognized the possibility of assessing unfair labor practice liability
against a lawyer who "purposely [aids] the employer in contravening the statute." NLRB v. Guild
Indus. Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1963). For a more detailed discussion of Guild,see
infra note 185.
168 The Board seldom uses its administrative rulemaking power, preferring instead to make
policy through adjudication. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571 (1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the National Labor Relation Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). Board policy made
through adjudication reflects the composition of the panel at any given time, leading to occasional,
and sometimes frequent, changes in position. The best example is the Board's practice of screening campaign propaganda for misrepresentation. The rule of Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 221 (1962), which allowed such review was reversed by the Board in Shopping Kart
Food Mkt., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). Following a change in the composition of the Board, Shopping Kart was overruled in favor of the Hollywood Ceramics position a little more than a year later
in General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). With yet another change in membership, however, the
Borad overruled General Knit in Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982), which
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abuse is limited by the narrow reach of the proposal. There should be

no liability for an advisor who, in good faith, counsels activity that later
turns out to violate the Act. In addition, advisors are not expected to
be seers and are obviously not responsible for the Board's frequent

changes in position. The proposal intends to reach only those attorneys
and consultants who knowingly counsel or participate in unlawful activity or who do so without a reasonable good faith belief in its legality.
To that extent, the range of liability for the advisor is considerably narrower than for employers, who can violate some sections of the Act
notwithstanding a lack of intent to do so and notwithstanding a good
169
faith intent not to do so.

No one pretends that advising employers about the vagaries of the
National Labor Relations Act is easy. It is the difficulty of the task that

has spawned much attorney and consultant activity. The difficulty of
giving legal advice, however, should not be a shield. This article does
not suggest that the Board look over the shoulders of advisors; it sug-

gests only that the Board pursue those who knowingly misuse the
law. 170
announced a return to the Shopping Kartstandard. For an interesting commentary on the Board's
use of the Getman study, supra note 37, in these shifts of policy, see Goldberg, Getman, & Brett,
supra note 37.
As of this writing, the Board's composition and actions indicate that more such changes may
be forthcoming. During the past several years, the Board has experienced considerable turnover
and often has had fewer than the maximum number of members. Indeed, the Board today has
only four members. In addition, two longtime members, John Fanning, who was appointed in
1957, and Howard Jenkins, who served 20 years, are gone. Both were perceived as sympathetic to
labor. The new appointees-Chairman Donald Dotson, Robert Hunter, and Particia Diaz Dennis-are generally thought to be more conservative. The Board already has announced that it
will reconsider the holding in Milwaukee Spring Div., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1982), made while
Fanning and Jenkins were still on the Board, that restricted the ability of employers to transfer
work from unionized to nonunionized workplaces. For a report on the oral argument heard by the
Board, see I Lab. Rel. Rep. 206 (1983).
169 Under section 8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), for example, the Board is concerned
with the effect of employer conduct on section 7 rights and often finds violations notwithstanding
a lack of intent to harm the rights of employees. See R. GORMAN, supra note 40, at 132-34 (if the
effect of employer conduct would be to coerce or restrain a "reasonable employee," a section
8(a)(1) violation would occur regardless of employer intent and without proof that any particular
employees was in fact coerced or restrained). An employer can also violate section 8(a)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982), by recognizing a minority union, even if the employer honestly believes
that the union has majority status. See International Garment Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.S.
731 (1961). In some cases, the General Counsel does not need to prove motive to establish unlawful discrimination under section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). See NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
170 A recent Note devoted to the narrow question of whether a consultant commits an unfair
labor practice by rendering unlawful advice premises liability on a different theory. Note, The
Liabilityof Labor Relations ConsultantsforAdvising UnfairLabor Practices,97 HARV. L. REV. 529
(1983). The student author offers an "unlawful instruction" theory, based on agency principles
rather than the consultant's control over the campaign. Id at 538-40. Indeed, the author accepted
without criticism the Board's decision in St. Francis,id. at 538, thereby ignoring the difficult prob-
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E. Scope of the Charges
Most charges filed against consultants allege violations of section
8(a)(1). Since consultants themselves have no bargaining obligation
enforceable under section 8(a)(5), 17 1 and since they may not have the
power to discriminate among employees, their actions usually are alleged merely to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employee rights. In
the Fabriccase, the administrative law judge seemed to indicate that
section 8(a)(l) provided the only relief against consultants. 172 Despite
his hesitancy, however, consultants or attorneys should bear responsibility for the 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) violations they cause.
The administrative law judge's confusion in Fabricstemmed from
a line of earlier cases primarily involving union unfair labor practices.
For example, in MalbaffLandscape Construction Co.,' 73 a union picketed a general contractor for using a nonunion subcontractor. The general thereupon fired the subcontractor. The issue was whether the
union had violated section 8(b)(2) 174 by causing the general, "an employer," to discriminate against the nonunion employees of the subcontractor, in violation of section 8(a)(e). t 75 Noting that the general had
not acted directly against any employees, but merely had terminated
his relationship with the subcontractor, the Board said that
an employer does not discriminate against employees within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(3) by ceasing to do business with another employer because of the union or nonunion activity of the latter's employees. While
• ..there may be employer discrimination against employer, we find no
justification in the Act ...for concluding that it was the purpose of Con-

gress under Section 8(a)(3) to176
protect employers as well as employees
from employer discrimination.
The Malbaff rationale proved persuasive to the administrative law
lem of regulating consultants who orchestrate unlawful campaigns, but against whom there is no

direct evidence of wrongdoing.
171 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). The section provides, in part, that it is an unfair labor practice
for "an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." (emphasis added). A consultant, then, does not violate the Act in his own right if he refuses to bargain
with his client's employees. However, the consultant might be liable as an agent. See infra text
accompanying note 184.
172 See supra text accompanying note 154.
173 172 N.L.R.B. 128 (1968).
174 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization "to
cause ... an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection [8](a)(3)."
175 Mallbaff Landscape Constr. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. at 128.
176 Id at 129. In so ruling, the Board overruled its previous decision in Northern Cal. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., (Musser), 119 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1957), in which the Board said
that a union does violate sections 8(b)(l)(a) and 8(b)(2) by causing an employer to have the employees of another employer removed from a construction site because the second employer's
employees were not members of the union. The plurality opinion also assessed section 8(a)(3)
liability against the first employer, reasoning that there was "no authority, either in the policy of
the Act or in any delineating provision of it, for holding that legal responsibility for a discrimination tending to encourage union membership is to be determined by the relationship actual or
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judge in Fabric,where the employer contended that it could not violate
section 8(a)(3) with respect to any employees other than its own. The
administrative law judge concluded from Malbaffthat "where the relationship between employer A and employer B is an ordinary contractual one, in which B has no substantial control (such as a veto power)
over the hire, tenure, or terms of employment of A's employees, B can77
not be held liable for an 8(a)(3) violation against A's employees."'
Thus, he found that section 8(a)(3) provided an "internal justification"
for giving a more restrictive meaning to the term "employer" than did
8(a)(1)178
Although the matter is not explained in the opinion, 2M was not
79
charged with the only section 8(a)(3) violation at issue in St. Francis.
Presumably the General Counsel and the administrative law judge
read Fabricas negating independent employer responsibility for section
8(a)(3) violations. Fabricdoes not compel any such result, however.
Indeed, in Dews, decided six years after Fabric,the independent employer was found guilty of violating section 8(a)(3).180 At most Fabric
means that an employer does not discriminate against another's employees merely because he refuses to do business with the other on account of the union activity of those employees. Acknowledging the
force of that decision, however, does no harm to the theory advanced
here. The basic thrust of both Fabricand Dews is that employers should
be held responsible when they have the power to effect unfair labor
practices, including unlawful discrimination. Although responsibility
may be less direct, a consultant who plans and implements an unlawful
campaign should be just as accountable for 8(a)(3) violations as for
8(a)(1) violations. In either case, the consultant's control over the campaign, and the resulting consequences to the employees, have rendered
him responsible for its result.
While section 8(a)(3) presents no significant difficulty in finding
liability against independent employers, section 8(a)(5) does. Thus,
section 2(3) says that "employees" for purposes of the Act are not limprospective between the employers involved." Id at 1031 (emphasis supplied). The opinion also
stated that the crucial question was whether or not an employer had the power to act against
employees because of their union activity:
It is sufficient that the discriminatee be a member of the working class in general and
that the 'employer' be any employer who has any interest, direct or indirect, in the conditions
of employment of the discriminatee or has any control, direct or indirect, over the terms of his
employment.
Id at 1032.
177 Fabric Servs., Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. at 542.
178 Id

179 The administrative law judge found that the employer violated section 8(a)(3) when, in
retaliation for union activity, it refused to pay registration fees and allow time off for certain
nurses to attend a seminar. St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 845-46.
180 See Dews Constr. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 182 (1977), discussed supratext accompanying notes
149-52. See also Georgia Pacific Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 982 (1977), discussed supra note 158.
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ited to the employees of any particular employer unless the Act "explicitly states otherwise."'' There is such an explicit statement in section
8(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain "with the representatives of his employees."' 82 Thus,
even if a consultant is independently an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, he must refuse to bargain with his own, and not
his client's, employees in order to violate section 8(a)(5). 83 In the typical case, however, liability can be assessed on another theory. For example, consultants or attorneys often are used as chief negotiators in
collective bargaining. In those cases, the consultant's status as an employer stems from his agency relationship to the direct employer. Since
the consultant is an agent, he can share equally in section 8(a)(5) liability. In West Coast Liquidators, for example, Gladys Selvin, an employer by
184 virtue of her agency, was found guilty of violating section
8(a)(5).

Moreover, if a consultant does not bargain for the employer, he
still might be liable under the broad reach of section 8(a)(1). For example, an employer who unlawfully refuses to bargain in hope of
decertifying the union clearly violates section 8(a)(5). If a consultant
planned the strategy and assisted in its implementation, his actions constituted the restraint, interference, or coercion with section 7 rights
banned by section 8(a)(1). In that case, the consultant should be liable
as an independent employer, without regard to his status as an agent.
IV.

OBJECTIONS

To
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A.

DiscouragingCounsel

One might expect that proposals as far reaching as those made
here will encounter serious objection, particularly from management
consultants and attorneys. The Board itself has declined the General
Counsel's urging to impose sanctions on advisors, reasoning that such
orders could interfere with an employer's ability to secure legal advice.
In St. Francis, for example, the adminsitrative law judge concluded
that assessing such liability would discourage employers from seeking
legal counsel, thus perhaps resulting in more, not fewer, unfair labor
practices. 8 5 It was ironic for the administrative law judge to predict
that the unfettered use of consultants would lead to cleaner campaigns
181 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
182 Id. § 158(a)(5) (emphasis added).

183 The Board recognized this interpretation in Austin Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1257, 1259 (1952).
184 West Coast Liquidators, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 512, 516 (1973).
185 According to the A.L.J.:
To hold Respondent 2M liable in these circumstances would constitute a serious intrusion into an employer's right to seek legal advice. In that regard, public policy has en-

couraged not discouraged obtaining professional assistance. If the General Counsel's theory
is adopted, the effect would be to discourage a party from seeking such advice....

The
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since he compared the consultant-led campaign in St. Francisto tactics
used against prisoners of war. 8 6 The point is that the administrative

law judge's initial premise is faulty. If consultants and management
attorneys understand that they can share liability for campaigns such as
the one waged in St. Francis,then they will have an incentive to act

more responsibly, both in campaign strategy and in implementation.
There is nothing in St. Francis,however, to encourage such re-

sponsible conduct. Especially in view of the Board's limited ability to
impose sufficient remedies against employers, this decision signals to
consultants that unlawful campaigns might be worth the risk. Barring
a bargaining order, 8 7 the employer loses little, and the consultant ben-

efits significantly in producing just the result desired by the employer.
Indeed, 2M's claimed success rate in NLRB elections allow it to88profit

from just such activity, with little fear of government sanction.'

Assessing liability against consultants who exercise substantial
control over the antiunion campaign, whether or not they actually di-

rect the unlawful conduct, treats them the same as any other employer.
In the typical case, the employer is liable for the unfair labor practices
committed by his supervisors or agents, whether or not he directs the
acts, authorizes them, or even approves of them. Consultants who effectively take the place of employers in directing the campaign should
result would very well be the commission of more, rather than fewer, unfair labor practices
by uninformed parties.
St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 849. The Fifth Circuit advanced a similar argument in NLRB
v. Guild Indus. Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1963). In that case, Judge Griffin Bell characterized as "unprecedented" the imposition of unfair labor practice liability on an attorney who
had interrogated at least 12 employees. ld. at 111. The court recognized that there were cases in
which company agents had shared in such liability. Judge Bell was aghast, however, at the prospect of imposing liability on an attorney:
We are unaware of any case where a lawyer has been held as a Respondent, as distinguished from holding the company through the conduct of its lawyer as its agent. This is not
to say that in a proper case a lawyer could not be held, but it must appear that the lawyer was
purposely aiding the employer in contravening the statute, rather than restricting his activity
to matters within the scope of and relevant to rights of the employer by way of proceedings
pending or imminent.
The right to counsel before an administrative agency such as the Labor Board, no less
than before courts, is a precious right and one to be preserved and given effect. To charge
is tantamount to a restraint, intimidatory and
counsel as here, and put him on trial .
coercive in nature.
Id at 112. Despite the harshness of the language, the court's decision did contemplate the possibility that lawyers could be charged "in a proper case." In Guil however, the court ultimately
held that there was no substantial evidence upon which to base a section 8(a)(l) violation, id at
112, thus giving the case little precedential value for determining what constitutes a "proper case."
186 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 844. The Board expressly did not rely on, and expressly
disavowed that characterization. Id. at 834 n.3.
187 See supra note 47.
188 In a letter submitted to the committee during the 1979-1980 Hearings, 2M claimed that in
1977 it handled 166 cases for employers and lost 11; in 1978 it handled 218 cases and lost 15; and
in 1979 it handled 312 and lost 23. 3 Hearings,supranote 4, at 125-26. Those figures represent a
success rate of about 93%.
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share the same kind of liability. This is not to propose that attorneys or
consultants assume such responsibility merely by representing employers who commit unlawful acts on their own. Liability should extend
only to those cases in which the consultant has, in effect, supplanted the
employer's function by controlling the antiunion campaign, has himself
participated in the unlawful act, or has advised or encouraged the employer to do so.
Nothing proposed here would threaten the ability of management
to enlist the aid of attorneys or consultants in resisting a union organizational effort. Indeed, some care has been taken to ensure that despite
the outcries of the labor movement, lawful aggressive campaigning is
beyond the reach of these proposals. The Board, however, should not
protect the ability of employers to receive advice that will assist them in
circumventing the statute. Holding advisors responsible for their misdeeds deprives no one of anything protected by the policy of the Act.
B.

Problems of Proof

Any proposal to sanction consultants and attorneys for their misconduct must take account of the procedures the Board will employ.
Two problems immediately become apparent. First, how can the
Board accumulate sufficient evidence to proceed against a consultant,
particularly in those cases in which the consultant's plan has worked
and the client may be unwilling to testify? Second, when the consultant
is also an attorney, how does the Board overcome the attorney-client
privilege?
These issues are of importance primarily in those cases in which a
consultant has stayed in the background, either controlling the campaign, as in St. Francis,or merely advising the employer to violate the
law. 8 9 No particular problems of either proof or privilege surface in
cases where the consultant has, through his own actions, violated the
law. For example, in collective bargaining cases like Selvin or in cases
of unlawful interrogation or threat, either employees or union representatives can testify about the actions of the consultant. Even if the
consultant is a lawyer, the attorney-client privilege is not breached
when an employee of the client testifies as to unlawful conduct of the
attorney, because the client, not the attorney, holds the privilege. 90
Nor is the privilege problem acute in cases of unlawful advice. As
a practical matter, it might be difficult for Board investigators to discover that a discriminatory discharge, for example, was the result of an
189 Indeed, the latter two cases were contemplated as early as the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
NLRB v. Guild Indus. Mfg. Corp., 321 F.2d at 112, since in such cases the consultant would be
"purposely aiding the employer in contravening the statute."
190 For a thorough discussion of the complex problem of when and to whom the privilege
applies, see J. WEINSTEIN & H. BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)[04], 503-41 to 50356.13 (1982).
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attorney's advice.' 9 1 If during the investigation, however, a supervisor
or manager claims that his action was taken on the advice of counsel,
the Board clearly will be able to pursue the inquiry. NLRB decisions
recognize that the attorney-client privilege cannot be claimed where the
attorney advises his client to violate the law.' 92 Moreover, in some
cases the client will not be reluctant to testify against the consultant. In
PlasticFilm ProductsCorp.,19 3 for example, the client was not only willing to testify, but also seemed anxious to explain that his unlawful con-

duct was not of his own design but it was prompted by Rayford

Blankenship, his consultant. 94 Blankenship is not an attorney,
although he occassionally has been mistaken for one.' 95 Even if he
191 For example, in Monroe Auto Equip., 153 N.L.R.B. 912, 919 (1965), a consultant was
charged with responsibility for the discriminatory discharge of an employee. The charge was
dismissed, however, because it depended solely on the uncorroborated hearsay testimony of a
former supervisor. Id. at 913 n.l, 919. But see Sierra Academy of Aeronautics, 182 N.L.R.B. 546
(1970), in which a consultant was charged, inter alia, with conspiring to prevent an employee from
voting in an NLRB election. See supra note 116. Although the only testimony implicating the
consultant was hearsay, the charge was sustained because of corroborating evidence. Id. at 549. It
is possible, then, to convict consultants of unfair labor practice charges even in the absence of
direct evidence of wrongdoing.
192 See. e.g., Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 231 N.L.R.B. 264, 270 n.10 (1977). See
also C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 199 (2d ed. 1972):
Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it
would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to a client who seeks advice to aid him in
carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme. . . . Accordingly, it is settled under modem
authority that the privilege does not extend to communications between attorney and client
where the client's purpose is the furtherance of a future intended crime or fraud.
193 238 N.L.R.B. 135 (1978).
194 Blankenship had addressed the employees, telling them that the employer could go out of
business and could even bum down the plant if he chose. He also interrogated employees and
spoke of other companies that had closed after unionization. Id at 143, 144-45. The administrative law judge concluded that Blankenship planned the campaign, characterizing it as an "all-out
campaign to frighten the employees." Id. at 143, 146. Ultimately, the employer fired Blankenship,
and apologized for his conduct during the campaign. Id. at 151-53.
195 In Ohio City Mfg., 238 N.L.R.B. 965, 966 (1978), the administrative law judge refered to
Blankenship as "Counsel for Respondent." Likewise, in Meyer Stamping & Mfg., 237 N.L.R.B.
1322, 1322 (1978), the majority refered to him as respondent's "labor counsel."
The author has in his possession a photocopy of a letter dated April 30, 1980, purportedly
signed by Blankenship, on which the letterhead is styled:
BLANKENSHIP and WILLIAMS
Labor Law Specialists
Representing Management in Union Matters, since 1965
The letter is a solicitation apparently sent to a company that had been charged with an unfair
labor practice. It says, among other things, "I am proud to be referred to as one of the 1,500
'union busters' in the entire nation. There can't be a better reference." The letter also criticizes
management's usual practice of calling in lawyers on labor matters: "Most lawyers are unfamiliar
with the Taft-Hartly [sic] law." Although the letter appears ambiguous to the author, Blankenship
does not claim in it that he is an attorney. He apparently has made that claim, however, since a
story in the IndianapolisStar reports that Blankenship has pleaded guilty to the unauthorized
practice of law. Interestingly, the newspaper reports that the judge denied a probation department
recommendation that Blankenship donate time to youth organizations, saying that youths "don't
need 'that kind of exposure.'"
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were, however, the privilege belongs
to the client, whose voluntary tes96
timony amounts to a waiver.
When the consultant is an attorney, the most difficult cases are
those like St. Francis. In that case, officers of the hospital were subpoenaed to testify about the involvement of 2M in the campaign.197 There
was no problem of attorney-client privilege since 2M representatives
were not attorneys. 98 Had they been attorneys, however, the privilege
almost certainly would have been claimed, absent waiver by the hospital. Even so, the privilege should not apply in these situations because
the communications are not within its scope. The underlying theory of
liability in a case like St. Francisis control. That is, the attorney-consultant is not liable as one who has personally violated the Act or given
unlawful advice, but, rather, is liable as one able to direct the employer's antiunion campaign. The attorney-client privilege, however,
applies only to legal advice; attorney-client consultations with respect
to business advice are not privileged.' 99
Activities like those undertaken by 2M in St. Franciscould hardly
be characterized as legal advice. First, the consultant did much more
than merely advise: it took responsibility, in effect, for a part of the
managerial activities of the employer. Moreover, even if 2M's activities
could be characterized as mere advice, it was advice about how to run
the business. The fact that the attorney may have counselled lawful
activities is not relevant here. According to one commentator, "Difficult
problems are posed because the average lawyer. . . often mixes legal
advice with business, economic and political counsel. . . . Unless the
communication is designed to meet problems which can be fairly characterized as predominantly legal, the privilege does not apply."'2
Even if 2M's representatives at St. Francis Hospital had been attorneys, their activities could not fairly have been characterized as
"predominantly legal." They both developed and implemented the antiunion strategy. In so doing, they exercised significant control over the
managerial activities of hospital supervisors. They were, in effect, managing that part of the business. Questions designed to expose that control do not violate the attorney-client privilege; they merely establish
the nature of the business relationship between the consultant and the
employer.
196 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 192, at 194-97.
197 St. Francis Hosp., 263 N.L.R.B. at 847.
198 During the 1979-1980 Hearings, Herbert Melnick, chairman of Modern Management, testi-

fied that his firm does not provide legal representation for its clients and that, in fact, "any employer we work for has Labor counsel.' 3 Hearings,supra note 4, at 79.
199 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 192, at 180 & n.22 ("where one consults an attorney
not as a lawyer but ... as a business advisor . . . or negotiator . . . the consultation is not

professional nor the statement privileged").
200 J. WEINSTEIN & H. BERGER, supra note 190, at 503-22.
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This construction of the privilege not only is in accord with basic
doctrine, but also is in keeping with general policy. The attorney-client
privilege protects the client. It encourages full disclosure to attorneys
in order that they can act "more effectively, justly and expeditiously."' 20 ' Given that rationale, it is easy to see that the privilege has
little application to the problem posed here.
There is no question that the privilege would shield the employer
against fishing expeditions by the General Counsel designed to discover employer wrongdoing. In most cases, however, the General
Counsel will establish employer liability without reference to any attorney-client consultation. Thus, under section 8(a)(1) the General Counsel likely will be concerned only with the effect of an employer's action,
not the communication passing between lawyer and client.20 2 Even in
the typical 8(a)(3) discriminatory discharges, the General Counsel can
establish employer liability without regard to attorney-client conversations. Under the Wright-Line test, the General Counsel needs to do
little more than establish effect, leaving it to the employer to explain
away the inference of unlawful intent. 20 3 In such cases, it will seldom
matter what the attorney has advised, or what the client has said to the
attorney, with respect to the employer's liability. To the extent that
such communication provides a defense, the client is free to waive it by
testifying.
The only real relevance of the attorney-client conference in this
context is to establish liability on the part of the attorney, not the client.
In theory, the privilege should not apply at all when it is the attorney
who is the subject of investigation. Construing the privilege in this
fashion, however, no doubt poses some danger to the client. Questions
about what a lawyer advised will sometimes reveal what the client had
asked, thus circumventing the protection that the privilege is intended
to provide. Even so, when it appears that the client has sought advice
about how to violate the law, or when an attorney's conduct or the
circumstances of a campaign otherwise give the Board reason to investigate, the Board should construe the privilege strictly. The same result
follows when the General Counsel seeks to establish attorney control
over the campiagn. Otherwise, the privilege will operate not to protect
201 Id.at 503-22. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 193, at 192-94.
202 See supra note 169.
203 In Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), the
Board held that in order to establish a section 8(a)(3) violation, the General Counsel must establish a prima facie case that the employee's protected activity was a "motivating factor" in the
employer's decision. Id. at 1089. The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the
same action would have been taken "even in the absence of protected conduct." Id. Under this
test, it seems unlikely that the General Counsel will, or could, introduce direct evidence of motive
in order to establish the prima facie case. Instead, as the Board said in Wright Line, it is for the
employer "to make the proof." Id. The Supreme Court recently upheld the Wright Line test in
NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 103 S.Ct. 2469 (1983).
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the client, but to shield an attorney from his own wrongdoing, thereby
significantly impeding the ability of the Board to insure compliance
with the law.
Consultants and attorneys also can be expected to argue that imposing liability on them will create problems even more serious than
that of attorney-client privilege. As PlasticFilm indicates, employers in
some cases are willing to blame their advisors for their transgressions,
perhaps seeking to save their own necks by strangling their consultants.
In these cases, the Board will have to make the same kinds of credibility determinations that it makes in a host of other proceedings. The
problem, however, is that in this type of case the client is testifying
against his attorney. Attorneys will object, then, arguing that the possibility of attorney liability will erect a barrier between them and their
clients, forcing them to view their clients as potential litigants rather
than as trusted confidantes and rendering them unable to provide effective representation.
Although this argument has some emotional appeal, it has little
basis in fact. First, most employers lack an incentive to use their consultants as scapegoats, since a finding of advisor liability will have little, if any, effect on their own liability. Employers are legally
responsible for their actions in the campaign, regardless of where the
plan originated. Second, even if some benefit could be derived by attributing responsibility to the advisor, attorneys and consultants are
able to protect themselves by documenting the advice they give. Attorneys in labor relations matters should not enjoy protection superior to
that of their colleagues involved in other forms of representation.
Although most lawyers do not, and should not, view their clients as
potential adversaries, the rash of legal malpractice actions has convinced attorneys to protect themselves in dealings with clients. 204 This
does not mean that labor attorneys or consultants need to be unduly
conservative or deny vigorous representation to their clients. It simply
means that such advisors must make a reasonable assessment of the
risk of any proposed management activity and advise the client accordingly. It also means that counselors cannot knowingly plan or participate in unlawful conduct. Finally, it could mean that an advisor will be
forced to withdraw his services from an employer who disregards his
advice and deliberately pursues an unlawful campaign. 20 5 Such a re204 See, e.g., O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered Methods/orAvoiding Conflicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability and Disqual#Feation,48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 693 (1980);
Rosen, A Reminder to .4 void Malpractice, 86 CASE & COM. 44 (May-June 1981).
205 Indeed, the recent amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility Model Rules
provide for just such a result. Thus, the comment to rule 1.6 provides, in part:
A lawyer may learn that a client intends prospective criminal or fraudulent conduct that
does not come within paragraph (b)(l). In such circumstances, the lawyer ordinarily should
counsel the client to desist. If the client insists upon pursuing the course of conduct, the
lawyer may withdraw. See Rule 1.16(b)(l). If the client insists that the lawyer provide assist-
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sult, however, does not deny legal representation to employers. It
merely promotes more responsible decision-making on the part of
management representatives and puts an end to the current practice of
using a confidential relationship to shield unlawful activity.
V.

REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE BOARD

A.

Cease and Desist Orders

The obvious purpose of classifying attorneys and consultants as
''employers" is to subject them to the remedial processes of the Board.
As already noted, the typical Board remedy is an order directing the
offender to cease and desist from further unlawful conduct. In the
20 6 the ordinary cease and
Gladys Selvin case, West Coast Liquidators,
desist order was broadened to include not only the case at hand, but

also her activities on behalf of other clients. 20 7 The imposition of this

so-called broad or blanket cease and desist order 2o8 followed a history
of involvement in similar unlawful conduct in at least eleven previous
cases beginning as early as 1958.209 Despite her notoriety, Selvin was
not even named as a party respondent until 1971.210 Then, even
though its own case reports detailed the extent of her unlawful activities in other cases, the Board narrowed the broad order recommended
by the trial examiner, noting that Selvin previously had not been

ance in furthering the course of conduct, the lawyer is obliged to withdraw. See Rule
1.6(a)(1).
T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, SUPPLEMENT TO PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,

88 (2d ed. 1983).

206 205 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973), enforced in part,527 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1975). For a more detailed description of Selvin's activities, see supranote 98.
207 Selvin was ordered to cease and desist from "[r]efusing to bargain in good faith with any
labor organization when she is [an] agent for any employer subject to the jurisdiction of the Board,
that has an obligation under the Act to bargain with said labor organization." Id at 517.
208 A broad order requires that an employer not only cease and desist from the particular
unlawful conduct at issue, but also refrain from violating the rights of employees, "in any other
manner." See, e.g., Jeffrey Mfg. Div., Dresser Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. 33, 39 n.33 (1980); Hickmott
Foods, 242 N.L.R.B. 1357 (1979). A broad order against a union typically requires that it cease
and desist not only within the present employment relationship, but that it also not engage in
similar conduct with any other entity subject to NLRB jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brotherhood of
Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, Internat'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs &
Helpers of Am. (C & T Trucking Co.), 191 N.L.R.B. 11 (1971) (broad order not warranted).
209 See supra note 96.
210 Selvin was first named as a respondent in West Coast Casket, 192 N.L.R.B. 624, enforcedin
part. 469 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1972). The case is typical of Selvin's actions. Selvin was the sole
bargaining representative for the employer. All bargaining sessions were held in her home, which
was not even equipped with a conference table, although union representatives were sometimes
provided with TV trays. See West Coast Liquidators and Mrs. Gladys Selvin, 205 N.L.R.B. at
513. The trial examiner found that Selvin's bargaining techniques "polarize[d any hostilities"
between the employer and the union and were calculated "to keep the negotiations off balance."
West Coast Casket, 192 N.L.R.B. at 636. He also observed that she found "frivolous objections"
to some union proposals. Id. at 637.
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named as a party respondent
and that the circumstances of the case did
2

not warrant a broad order. "1
The Board's usual criterion for imposition of a broad order is a
proclivity to violate the Act, demonstrable either through prior Board
decisions or the facts of a particular case. 2 ' 2 In addition, the Supreme
Court has said: "To justify an order restraining other violations it must
appear that they bear some resemblance to that which the employer has
committed or that danger of their commission in the future is to be

anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past." 21 3 Thus, both

the Board's standard and the Supreme Court's seem to contemplate the

possibility of a broad order even without a prior conviction, especially
for one with a history as colorful as Gladys Selvin's.
Even if a prior offense is a necessary or desirable condition for
imposition of a broad order, however, that does not explain why consultants have not been the subject of individual action more frequently.
Although the Board's complaint cannot exceed the scope of the charge,
its case-handling manual provides that, should the investigation reveal
the possibility of other violations, "[t]he charging party should be given
the opportunity to file appropriate amendments.

' 2 14

Thus, if the inves-

tigation produced evidence of consultant wrongdoing, the Board could
notify the charging party (often the union) and most likely obtain a
charge naming the consultant as an employer.
Labor has long bemoaned the inadequacy of the Board's remedial
power, particularly the cease and desist order, which has been likened

to being "slapped on the wrists with a feather." 2 5 While it may be true

that Board processes themselves provide little relief and assure little in

the way of deterrence, the federal courts of appeals can provide more
protection by not only enforcing the orders, but also securing compli-

ance through contempt powers. 2 16 Although Board cease and desist or-

211 Id. at 624 n.2. In fact, in West Coast Casket, the trial examiner relied in part on the reported activity of Selvin in three other cases. See id. at 637-39. Moreover, in Miscellaneous Warehousemen, Drivers & Helpers, Local 986 (Tak-Trak, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1964), the Board
said of Selvin: "her reputation ... in the field of labor relations is so notorious that one may well
question whether any employer desirous of establishing a mutually satisfactory bargaining relationship with his employees' representative would designate her as his negotiator." Id. at 1519.
The Board did uphold a Trial Examiner's recommendation of a broad order the following year in
Chalk Metal Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1133 (1972), but the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce that part of
the order, 527 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (1975).
212 See, e.g., Chalk Metal Co., 197 NL.R.B. at 1133.
213 NLRB v. Express Publ. Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437 (1941).
214

NLRB

CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART ONE): UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS

(CCH) § 10054.2 (March 1983). See also id. § 10064.5 ("Where ULP not Specified in Charge
Uncovered").
215 See Mazzocchi, The Labor Movement at the Crossroads, The Challenges of Organizing, 11
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 22 (1983).
216 Although the Board has no enforcement power of its own, section 10(e) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982), authorizes the Board to seek enforcement of its orders in the federal courts
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ders may not deter lawbreaking consultants, contempt citations issued
by federal appellate courts will capture their attention. Consultants are
not likely to engage in unlawful conduct at the risk of substantial fines
or imprisonment. 21 7 And even though these -sanctions would not be
imposed directly against an offending employer, they may lessen the
employer's willingness or opportunity to violate the Act: not only
would an employer see the sanctions imposed against the consultant,
but, more importantly, a consultant aware of the consequences would
be reluctant to counsel unfair practices. If the labor movement's theory
that much of the impetus for unlawful activity comes from consultants
is correct (and there is evidence to suggest that it is), then dissuading
the consultants should have the effect of lessening the number or severity of unfair labor practices.
It should be emphasized that this proposal is neither contrary to
the policy of the Act, nor more severe than is necessary to deal with the
problem at hand. It is true that Board orders are remedial, not punitive, and that this proposal suggests the possibility of fines and imprisonment as the ultimate sanction. Nonetheless, current NLRB
procedure contemplate the possibility of punishment for contempt of
NLRB orders.218 Thus, this proposal does not suggest a new remedy,
but merely a new respondent. Moreover, the proposal does not contemplate that such action will be taken against every consultant who
counsels unlawful activity. The basic proposal is that these offenders
be made parties to the unfair labor practice proceedings and be subjected to Board remedial orders. Persistent or egregious. offenders
should be subjected to broad orders. Only those offenders who show
contempt for the authority of both the agency and the courts would be
subjected to punitive action.
B. Refusal to Bargain
Simply subjecting consultants and attorneys to cease and desist orof appeal. For an example of a contempt order, sought by petition of the Board, see Stevens
XVIII, 563 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977). In this case, both the corporation
and supervisory personnel were named as respondents. See also Bartosic & Lanoff, Escalatingthe
Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1972).
217 In Stevens XVIII, 563 F.2d at 23, the employer was ordered to pay all Board expenses,
including salaries, and all court costs, including those of the special master. In addition, the Board
proposed a compliance fine of $ 120.000, plus $5,000 a day for each day of future violation, id at
25, as well as $1,000 fines and $100 a day against the named supervisors, id. at 25 n.28. The court
characterized the fines as an "extremely serious remedy," and deferred action in order to give the
respondents another chance to show that the Board's proposals were unrealistic. Id. at 25. Previously. the respondents had merely dismissed the proposals as having "no relationship to reason or
present reality." Id. at 22 n.21. In addition, the court said that should these remedies not insure
compliance, it was "quite prepared to consider more drastic sanctions both for the company and
for the individual respondents." Id. at 26.
218 See NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART THREE): COMPLIANCE PROCEEDINGS (CCH)
§ 10510.1 (March 17, 1980).
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ders need not exhaust the remedial effort of the Board. As the Gladys

Selvin cases aptly demonstrates, employers sometimes deliberately
frustrate the bargaining process, either by refusing to agree to anything
of substance, or by prolonging bargaining to the point where it be21 9
comes meaningless.
The NLRB is understandably reluctant to determine that an em-

ployer has bargained in bad faith merely from the content of the employer's proposals. 220 The Board recognizes that the philosophy of the
Act is one of private agreement, not government-imposed terms.
Sometimes, however, the proposals, as well as other conduct of the em-

ployer, convince the Board that the employer never intended in good
faith to reach an agreement. 221 Those cases are particularly difficult to
remedy, since the Board has no power to force the employer to agree to
a union proposal or to make a proposal that is acceptable to the
union. 222 Board remedies, therefore, are usually limited to an order to

cease and desist from bargaining in bad faith and an affirmative order
to bargain in good faith in the future. 223 The Board is unable even to
compensate employees for lost wages or benefits as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain in good faith.224
Recently, however, NLRB remedies in refusal to bargain cases

have taken a new twist. In particularly egregious cases, the NLRB has
ordered employers to pay the reasonable negotiating expenses of the
219 In addition to the Selvin cases, supra note 96, see also the J.P. Stevens cases, supra note 36.
220 The reluctance stems from section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) which defines the obligation to bargain collectively and provides "such obligation does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession." Even in those instances in which the Board has
considered the content of the proposals, the courts of appeals have carefully scrutinized the
Board's orders. See, e.g., White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958). But see Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. deniea 346 U.S. 887 (1953). See generally R. GORMAN,
supra note 40, at 489-95 (listing instances of the Board finding bad faith from certain proposals).
221 See, e.g., Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
222 See, e.g., Trustees of Boston Univ., 228 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1010 (1977). The Board's single
attempt to order a clause into a contract was struck down by the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter
Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In declining to enforce the Board's decision ordering the employer to agree to a "check-off" clause, the Court said:
While the parties' freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board
to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract.
Id. at 108.
223 See generally R. GORMAN, supranote 40, at 532-39 (the Board cannot impose substantive
contract terms not agreed upon by the parties, and the Board has not imposed "make whole"
remedies, which would require the employer to pay employees what they would have received had
the employers not unlawfully delayed bargaining).
224 See e.g., Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972), enforced in pert. part, 502 F.2d 349
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied,421 U.S. 991 (1975); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970),
enforced,449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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union. 225 The theory seems to be that since the employer never seri-

ously intended to bargain, it should compensate the aggrieved party
(the union) for its loss. In some cases, it appears that the consultant
either formulated management's strategy or willingly participated in
it.226 In those cases in which consultants or attorneys knowingly engage in dilatory bargaining calculated to deny the right of employees to
bargain collectively, the Board, under section 10(C), 227 should order

them to share in the liability. If an employer is determined to oust the
union, an attorney has much incentive to counsel bad faith bargaining
as one technique. The hope is that the employees ultimately will become disenchanted with the union and decertify it. As already demonstrated, NLRB remedies are weak, and courts seem reluctant to enforce

orders or issue contempt citations against employers who have actually
met with union representatives, although they may have done little
more than talk. Knowing that they might share in financial liability
would likely deter advisors from counseling such activity. Moreover,
attorneys and consultants would undertake a collective bargaining assignment on behalf of a client only in those cases in which it was clear
225 See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 738, 773 (1978), enforcement denied inpert part
and remande, 623 F.2d 322, 328-30 (4th Cir. 1980) (Board order allowed recovery of litigation
expenses for both Board and union and negotiation expenses for the union). See also Memorandum ofNLRB GeneralCounsel,I LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 9059 (1978): "lIlt will be appropriate in
cases where bad faith surface bargaining is to be alleged to seek a remedy requiring reimbursement by respondent of the charging party's bargaining expenses resulting from that unfair labor
practice."
In addition to negotiation expenses, there are other cases which allow reimbursement of some
or all of the organizational expenses of the union and the legal expenses of both the union and the
Board. One such case, American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), involved a
frivilous delay in collective bargaining. Other cases have allowed recovery of expenses as a result
of serious employer unfair labor practices in organizational campaigns. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lehigh Lumber Co., 94 Lab. Cas. 13, 574 (3d Cir. 1982) (contempt citation allowing recovery of
NLRB expenses, including attorney salaries); International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 502
F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (revised reimbursement order for Board litigation expenses; affirmed
reimbursement order for union litigation expenses). The policy here does not differ greatly from
that discussed in the text. Thus, if the consultant directed the unlawful campaign, as in St. Francis, see supranotes 100-22 and accompanying text, or personally participated in the unlawful activity, he should share in the order to pay such expenses. Obviously, in the case of personal
participation, the extent of the consultant's liability is a proper matter for the discretion of the
Board. In cases like St. Francis,however, where the consultant controlled the entire campaign, he
should be held jointly and severally liable.
226 For example, in the Selvin cases, supra note 96, the consultant's tactics were ordinarily the
instrumentality used to frustrate negotiations. Indeed, in cases like Pease Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 1069
(1978), where the Board said that the employer entered negotiations with a closed mind with the
hope of provoking a strike leading to eventual decertification, it is difficult to understand how the
employer's intention could have been carried out without the participation of the attorney who
served as negotiator.
227 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982). Section 10(c) provides that, in addition to ordering a respondent
to cease and desist from unlawful conduct, the Board also can "take such affirmative action with
or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act." The quoted language is to be
liberally construed, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
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that management .was prepared to comply with its obligation to bargain
in good faith.
A similar remedy is available in a related situation. As already
noted, employers use the delay inherent in NLRB and judicial proceedings to their advantage, either by delaying elections or by putting off
the obligation to bargain. An employer can delay the obligation to bargain for a year or more merely by refusing to comply with an NLRB
bargaining order and forcing the Board to obtain judicial enforcement.22 8 Currently, employees are not entitled to back pay for the period consumed by the judicial proceedings in these so-called "technical
violations" even though, if the order is enforced, the employer's bar2 29
gaining obligation dates from the time of the Board's original order.
The same is true even if the employer's refusal to comply was not based
on any significant grounds. 230 Recently, the Board has tried to temper
employer enthusiasm for this delay technique by ordering employers to
pay the organization expense of the union and the litigation costs of the
Board's General Counsel and of the union in those cases where employer objection to NLRB bargaining orders were "frivolous." 231
Again, the Board should expand the scope of its order to include attorneys or consultants who counsel such activity or engage in it knowing
that it was calculated to violate employee rights. That is not to suggest
that an employer's representative should pay the legal costs of the
Board every time an NLRB bargaining order is enforced by the court
of appeals. It is likely, however, that attorneys would be instrumental
in planning and implementing unlawful delay of an employer's bargaining obligation that involves misuse of administrative and judicial
proceedings. Since such tactics could not be carried on without cooperation of the employer's counsel, they clearly share in breaking the law
and should likewise share in the consequences.
228 A union that wins an NLRB conducted election becomes the exclusive representative of the
employees in the bargaining unit for the "purpose of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay" and other employment conditions under section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
The certification resulting from that election, however, is not a final order of the Board subject to
judicial enforcement. American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). If the employer
refuses to bargain, the Board's sole recourse is to secure relief under the unfair labor practice
procedures for a violation of section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). A bargaining order
resulting from that procedure is a final order subject to judicial enforcement under section 10(e),
id § 160(e). For a more detailed description of this circuitous procedure, see R. GORMAN, supra
note 40, at 59-61. The St. Francis case is a good example of the considerable delay that this
procedure entails. The Board's order was issued on August 30, 1982, St. Francis Hosp., 263
N.L.R.B. 834 (1982), and was enforced by the D.C. Circuit on March 16, 1984, St. Francis Hosp.,
729 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
229 See Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234 (1972); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107
(1970). But see IUE v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
230 See supra note 229.
231 Heck's Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 765 (1974); R. GORMAN, supranote 40, at 532-39. Seealso Wellman Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. 325 (1980).
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C.

Restrainton Activities

In addition to these sanctions, a recent federal court decision suggests that more extreme action can be taken against particularly outrageous conduct. In NLRB v. Lehigh Lumber Co.,232 Judge Van Dusen,
sitting as Special Master in a contempt proceeding, detailed the unlawful behavior of Louis M. Busch, an attorney hired as negotiator by several companies. 233 Judge Van Dusen concluded that the respondents
had violated the Board's order, enforced by the court, to bargain with
the union in good faith. Among the sanctions he recommended were
orders to pay all NLRB costs, including attorney salaries. 234 In addition, citing NLRB v. Selvin, he suggested that the court consider ordering the employers not to use Busch as their negotiator. 235 Although the
Third Circuit decided that the other sanctions were sufficient, 236 Judge

Van Dusen's proposal has some merit.
As previously noted, employers who seek to delay or frustrate the
bargaining process cannot succeed without the cooperation of their ne-

gotiator. Since Busch was not a party in Lehigh, the case report does
not detail his role in planning the employers' unlawful conduct. Nonetheless, Judge Van Dusen's findings graphically detail Busch's outrageous behavior. Clearly, the Board has no business choosing the legal
representative of employers. It should not, therefore, order the removal
of Busch as attorney. It should, however, on facts as severe as those in
Lehigh or the Selvin cases, order the removal of the chief impediment
to the bargaining process. To that extent, the Board would not deny
employers the right to secure legal counsel, but would insure that its
order to bargain is not ignored. At the very least, individuals like
232 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2213 (3d Cir. 1981).
233 The Master's report describes in some detail the delaying tactics used by Busch and his
client, and other tactics which the Master concluded were "conscious efforts... to disrupt bargaining through irritating unfair allegations [that] were not consistent with bargaining in good
faith." Id. at 2217. Among other things, Busch both offered and rejected proposals without discussion or explanation, refused to tell the union which companies he represented, and, upon continued questioning, "repeated many times in a childish, sing-song voice, 'Stick around you might
find out.'" Id. at 2216-17. When his dilatory bargaining tactics prompted the union to leave a
meeting in protest, "Busch and [Lehigh's president] said in a sarcastic, childish, sing-song voice,
'Please don't leave,' and they clasped their hands in prayer-like fashion." Id at 2217. In addition,
at one bargaining session, the president of Lehigh, in the presence of Busch, "repeatedly made
faces at the Union members, stuck out his tongue at them, and waved his fingers at them with his
thumbs in his ears." Id at 2216.
234 Id. at 2221. Judge Van Dusen also recommended that the employers comply with prior
orders of the court, bargain with the union in good faith, make no unilateral changes without first
negotiating with the union, post certain notices, mail copies of notices to employees, report compliance to the court, and pay compliance fines. Id. at 2220-21.
235 Id.at 2222.
236 NLRB v. Lehigh Lumber Co., 94 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 13,574, at 21,153 (3d Cir. 1982). The
Court also modified the compliance fines to serve as security for the other orders. Id.at 21,153.
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Busch and Selvin should be named as party respondents so that they
ultimately can be subjected to the contempt powers of the courts.
The Board needs to do more, however, than rely on the contempt
sanction. The Lehigh case demonstrates the ineffectiveness of that process. The Board's order to bargain was first issued in July of 1977.237
The Third Circuit entered its contempt order five years later. During
that period there had been no good faith negotiations. Not only does
the Board lack a way to compensate employees for their financial loss
during that period, it is also impossible to repair or even measure the
damage done to the union's status as representative. Indeed, it is this
latter factor which could prompt such dilatory bargaining tactics.
Perhaps removing Busch as negotiator would not have remedied
the employer's intransigence. But such action would at least make it
harder for employers to hide behind counsel in carrying out their unlawful objectives. It would also serve notice on attorneys and consultants that those who abuse the system are not only subject to remedial
action, but also may be excluded from participating in the system.
VI.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER PROPOSALS

The remedies proposed by this paper are by no means exclusive,
either in terms of the narrow problem of dealing effectively with consultants or the broader issue of diminishing the considerable advantage
that management has in organizing campaigns. As to the latter, the
proposals advanced by the defunct Labor Law Reform Act of 1978238
would have gone a long way toward loosening management's grip on
the minds of the employees. 239 Given the current political makeup of
both the legislative and executive branches, however, it seems unlikely
that that legislation, or any even remotely like it, will be revived in the
near future. Indeed, legislative action offers little hope for any significant reform. Although the 1974 amendments did expand the numbers
of employees which labor could organize, 24° every other significant
amendment since 1935 has narrowed, not broadened, labor's power. 24 '
237 230 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1977), enforced,577 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.) cen. denied,439 U.S. 928 (1978).
238 S. REP. No. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

239 In addition to providing double back pay, the proposal would have allowed equal access to
unions when employers gave a so-called "captive audience" speech, H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978), placed time limits on NLRB election processes, id at 54-55; provided
for debarrment from federal contracts in certain instances, id at 58; and allowed, as remedies, the
imposition of double back pay in discharge cases and make whole relief in refusal to bargain

cases. Id.
240 The so-called "Health Care Amendment," Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974), removed
the exclusion for non-profit hospitals from the definition of employer found in 29 U.S.C. § 152(2),
thus bringing the employees of such entities within the protection of the Act.
241 The Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), significantly amended
§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157, by expressly protecting the right of employees to refrain from union or concerted activity; added six union unfair labor practices to section 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(l)-(6),
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One need only remember that the 1978 legislation died during the tenure of a sympathetic president and a "veto proof' Congress.
There are, however, other regulatory steps that could be taken.
The one most frequently urged is greater enforcement of management
consultant reporting pursuant to the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 242 which requires that consultants and
attorneys report the nature of certain activity undertaken on behalf of
their clients and the money received. 243 Although labor unions have
faithfully reported their activities as required by that legislation, compliance by management representatives charitably can be described as
insignificant. One prominent study indicated that most management attorneys were not even aware of the law's requirements. 244
It may well be true, as some commentators have argued, that enforced compliance would significantly aid labor's ability to counter
some consultant-inspired campaign tactics. If nothing more, the union
would be aware of the presence of a particular representative. Desirable as that result might be, however, it is unlikely to solve the primary
problem addressed in this article. Management advisors who are willing to violate the National Labor Relations Act will not be deterred
merely because they must report their activities, in general terms, to the
Department of Labor. Surely, no one seriously expects that management consultants will admit any more in the reports they draft than
they now admit under cross-examination by the Board's General
Counsel. Thus, while enforcement of the reporting requirements is to
be encouraged and may well prove beneficial, it is not likely to dissuade consultant-inspired unfair labor practices.
A more direct sanction is to bar violators from practice before the
National Labor Relations Board.245 Currently, Board rules permit such
action only for misconduct during or related to a hearing.246 The
which included outlawing the secondary boycott under section 8(b)(4); and added section 10(e), 29
U.S.C. § 160(1), which obligated the Board to seek injunctions in secondary boycott cases prior to
final action by the Board.
The Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), broadened the
secondary boycott restrictions and placed significant restrictions on recognitional picketing under

section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7). It also banned so-called hot cargo agreements under section
8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
242 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
243 For detailed descriptions of the reporting requirements, see Bernstein, supranote 14, at 1141; Craver, supranote 14, at 609-19.
244 See Craver, supra note 14, at 626.
245 See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 50-54.

246 29 C.F.R. § 102.66 (1983) provides in part:
(d)(1) Misconduct at any hearing before a hearing officer or before the regional director
or the Board shall be ground for summary exclusion from the hearing. (2) Such misconduct
of an aggravated character, when engaged in by an attorney or other representative of a
party, shall be ground for suspension or disbarment by the Board from further practice before
it after due notice and hearing.
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Board has been chary about imposing such sanctions, even in the face
of highly questionable conduct. 247 One commentator has proposed
that the Board expand its rule to allow disbarrment not only of those
who abuse the actual hearings, but also of those who counsel or participate in the commission of unfair labor practices. 248 The same commentator has also urged more aggressive enforcement of ethical standards
by local bar associations or other enforcement agencies. 249 The threat
of exclusion from law practice or NLRB practice, or the possibility of
public reprimand, probably would deter unlawful conduct among
those attorneys who derive considerable income from such activities.
The proposal, however, has a limited reach, since many management
consultants are not attorneys, are not subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the states, and do not practice before the NLRB. A threat to
deprive them of the opportunity to appear before the Board would not
deter any unlawful activity. Moreover, even if practitioners were
barred from practice before the Board, or even excluded from the practice of law, they could remain "backroom" advisors and still participate
in the campaigns themselves. While the disbarrment and disciplinary
proposals are worthy of adoption, then, it seems clear that they are illdesigned to deter the unlawful activities discussed here. The only sanction likely to reach those practices, absent legislative reform, is increasing the scope of unfair labor practice prosecutions.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The NLRA and the administrative processes of the NLRB allow
employers to reap considerable advantage by violating the law. In
their efforts to remain nonunion, employers can, and do, violate employee rights with little fear of serious consequences. Given the lack of
punitive sanction, the Board's ability to proceed against those who are
determined to ignore the statute is quite limited. While employers may
not welcome the Board's remedial measures, they are less severe, from
an employer's viewpoint, than a unionized work force. This Article has
not proposed the perfect solution to the problem. Indeed, as long as the
statute assumes that employers will respect both the law and the
Board's authority-a doubtful proposition at best-there is little likelihood that the strategy of unlawful resistance will cease.
The proposals advanced here, however, would make unlawful
strategies more difficult to implement and, in the process, probably reduce the extent of the problem. Certainly, not all unfair labor prac247 See, e.g., Maietta Contracting, 265 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1982), in which the Board refused to
sanction attorney Joel Keiler despite its finding that he "behaved inappropriately and unprofessionally throughout the hearing," and despite the Board's recognition that he had engaged in
similar behavior in at least two other cases, id. at 1280.
248 See Bernstein, supra note 14, at 46-47.
249 a at 56-62.
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tices, and not even all elaborately planned campaigns, result from
consultant activity. But some employers (and given the small size of
the typical bargaining unit, perhaps many) take their lead from experts.
As already mentioned, those experts currently have nothing to lose and
much to gain by devising and assisting unlawful campaigns. If the
Board is to fulfill its obligation to protect employee rights, it must proceed, not only against employers, but against those who plan and participate in their campaigns.
In pursuing that objective the Board can legitimately expect help
from other quarters. Thus, the Department of Labor should pursue
more vigorous enforcement of the LMRDA. State and local bar associations should be alerted to unlawful conduct on the part of lawyers
and take appropriate action. The Board itself should bar persistent violators from its processes. It must, however, do more-it must make
lawbreaking consultants and attorneys the target of unfair labor practice prosecution. These combined proposals will not only furnish the
regulatory agencies with a record of consultant activity and conduct;
they will also both deny lawbreakers a role in the adjudicative process
and control their role as backroom advisors.
Anyone experienced in labor relations will quickly recognize that
employer representatives will not easily submit to such regulation. Perhaps more than in any other area of legal practice, representing clients
in labor relations matters is often a game, albeit for high stakes, in
which the opposing factions bluff and maneuver for advantage. If labor law consultants are to be the subject of unfair labor practice proceedings, one might expect them to respond, not by reforming their
conduct, but by more effectively disguising it. Given the ingenuity of
counsel for both management and labor, that possibility is not easily
ignored. Even the process of disguise, however, might render some
benefit. For example, many of the cases involve direct participation by
management representatives in unlawful conduct. If these proposals
curtail that activity for fear of easy detection, they will have accomplished something. In addition, while one should not underestimate
the ingenuity of counsel, one must also recognize the capacity of the
Board to discern smoke.
If the case reports teach us anything, it is that management representation is big business and that unlawful strategy and advisor domination of campaigns is an important part of that business.
Implementing these proposals might prompt representatives to try to
continue their current practices by camouflaging their control or hedging their advice. As to the former possibility, the NLRB has considerable experience in discerning real as opposed to purported motives and
facts, and will not be easily misled. As to the latter, this Article already
has recognized that problems exist in proving unlawful advice. The
NLRB, however, should have little difficulty deciding cases in which
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representatives orally counsel unlawful conduct and attempt to cover
their tracks by a subsequent neutral writing. If a client who has been
the subject of such treatment will testify against the representative, little
more than a credibility determination is involved. On the other hand,
if these proposals do cause representatives to hedge or "weasel word"
their advice, they will, again, have accomplished something. Clients
may then recognize that the tendered advice is not without controversy
and seek more guidance before following it.
These proposals are not designed to eliminate unfair labor practices, nor, realistically, will they discourage all unlawful activities by
management representatives. As long as management has the right or
the ability to campaign against unions, and as long as it seeks assistance
from outside advisors, the possibility exists that either the law or its
processes will be exploited. This Article does not oppose lawful, aggressive campaigning. Nor does it question the need for expert advice
or assistance. It does, however, assert that the Board must do more
than it has to limit the industry that its neglect has helped to spawn.
There is significant evidence that employers are using outside representatives to violate the statute that the National Labor Relations
Board exists to enforce. Board action that imposes sanctions on those
who counsel lawlessness would not only demonstrate the agency's determination to protect statutory rights, but also likely would reduce
both the incentive and the opportunity for employers to violate the law.

